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A PLEA FOR MONSTERS1
 Philippe Schlenker
0 Introduction
According to an influential theory (Kaplan 1989), indexicals are directly referential: they pick
out their referents directly from the context of utterance, without the mediation of a Fregean Sense. A
corollary of this theory is that the value of an indexical is fixed once and for all by the context of
utterance, and cannot be affected by the logical operators in whose scope it may appear. This is
summarized in the following thesis, which makes indexicals ‘scopeless’ (to borrow Kaplan’s recent
terminology):
(1) Fixity Thesis (a corollary of Direct Reference): The semantic value of an indexical is fixed
solely by the context of the actual speech act, and cannot be affected by any logical operators.
The term ‘context’ is taken to apply to any speech situation2, not just to the speech act in which a
sentence is actually produced. Thus operators could be defined that shift the context of evaluation of
an indexical3.  Although Kaplan grants that such operators are conceivable, he calls them ‘monsters’
because they contradict his thesis. He goes on to claim (optimistically) that monsters do not and
could not exist in natural language.
On the face of it, this conclusion appears to be correct. This is best seen by contrasting the
behavior of definite descriptions with that of indexicals. I may utter truly: ‘At some point, the person
talking was John’. But I couldn’t do the same with: ‘At some point, I was John’ (unless I am John, of
course). Why should that be? The definite description can take scope below the temporal operator,
with a reading (‘de dicto’) rendered in (2a), equivalent to: at some point in the past, the person
talking at that time was John. And of course there is no reason the current speaker (me) should have
been talking at all past moments as well. An alternative, ‘de re’ reading is represented in (2b), where
the description is given wide scope:
(2) a.P [ιx: S(x)] (x=John)
b. [ιx: S(x)] P (x=John)
a’. [∃t: t<t*][ιx: speaker(x, t)] (x=John)
b’. [∃t: t<t*][ιx: speaker(x, t*)] (x=John)
The same contrast can be represented in an extensional system without scopal difference, as in (2a’)
and (2b’). The distinction there is whether the time variable of the predicate ‘speaker’ is bound by
the time quantifier, or is left free, with a contextually supplied value (here ‘t*’ is taken to denote the
time of utterance).
Interestingly, the indexical ‘I’ appears only to have the equivalent of the ‘wide scope’ reading
represented in (2)a and (2)a’. In this case one might well argue that this is simply because indexicals
are context-dependent rather than time-dependent. If we could find a quantifier over contexts rather
than over moments, maybe it could affect the semantic value of ‘I’. But this is precisely what Kaplan
denies. Since indexicals are directly referential, their semantic value cannot be manipulated in this
fashion. The failure of our attempt to get ‘I’ to refer to someone other than me, P.S., is not the result
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 If the term ‘context’ were defined as ‘a situation on which the semantic value of certain expressions (indexicals)
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think, however, that this is how Kaplan understands the term ‘context’.
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of choosing the wrong quantifier. The attempt was doomed on principled grounds. This result is
clearly positive if it is assumed (as is commonly done) that indexicals do indeed display the behavior
predicted by the Fixity Thesis. In fact, a theory that posited that indexicals have the same kind of
Sense as descriptions would be at a loss to account for such a behavior.  In particular, since
(according to Frege) an expression in indirect discourse can refer to its ordinary Sense, a sentence
such as ‘John thinks that I am a hero’ should have a reading that attributes to John a thought of the
form: ‘I am a hero’. But in that case ‘I’ would fail to refer to me, the speaker of the actual speech act.
If a theory based on Sense is correct, why does this case not occur?
Why not, indeed? I will claim that this case does in fact occur, that it falsifies the Fixity
Thesis, and that it argues for a version (albeit a somewhat elaborate one, which involves variables
and presuppositions) of a Sense-based theory.  Specifically, I will display several indexicals across
languages which display a ‘monstrous’ behavior when they appear in the scope of an attitude
operator. Here is as schematic example (from Amharic):
(3) Situation to be reported: John says: ‘I am a hero’
a. Amharic (lit.): Johni says that Ii am a hero
b. English: Johni says that hei is a hero / *Johni says that Ii am a hero
Although English ‘I’ is well-behaved, its Amharic counterpart isn’t, and may in (3a) refer to the
speaker of the reported speech act rather than of the actual speech act4. The value of the Amharic 1st
person pronoun can in this case be affected by an attitude operator, which contradicts the Fixity
Thesis.  (Amharic is the key here, but even if you distrust such exotic data, or are solely interested in
English, do not rejoice too quickly.  Similar examples can be constructed for English, albeit in a
different domain. Details are given below.)
At this point one might be tempted to plead terminological ambiguity. In what sense is the
Amharic expression an ‘indexical’ in Kaplan’s sense? Let us use context-dependency as a Definition:
an expression qualifies as indexical if its semantic value is determined by some feature of a context
of utterance. We may further distinguish expressions that are lexically specified as indexical ('strict
indexicals', which can only be interpreted indexically) from those that have indexical uses. For
instance ‘he’ can be used indexically (e.g. with a pointing gesture); but it can also be a bound
variable, and thus it is not lexically specified as indexical. According to this criterion Amharic ‘I’ is a
strict indexical: it always refers to the speaker of some context. As it happens, this doesn’t have to be
the context of the actual speech act, and for this reason the expression fails to satisfy the Fixity
Thesis. Obviously if the Thesis were taken as a definition, the purported counterexamples would go
away. However the interesting claim (the one I want to challenge) is that the class of expressions
singled out by the above Definition happen to satisfy the Fixity Thesis5.
The reason there are systematic counterexamples to the Thesis, I will claim, is that quite
generally an attitude report manipulates a context variable, whose value may fix the reference of
indexicals that appear in its scope. In traditional model-theoretic accounts, attitude verbs are
essentially construed as quantifiers over possible worlds. Thus ‘John believes that it is raining’ is true
just in case it is raining in every world compatible with John’s belief.  I will argue for a minimal
modification of this analysis.  What shifted indexicals of the Amharic variety show, I’ll suggest, is
that attitude verbs are quantifiers over contexts of thought- or of speech.  Since a context determines
a single world of thought or utterance, and other things in addition (a speaker, a time of utterance,
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and sometimes a hearer), the theory to be presented is strictly more fine-grained than the standard
one, in a way which is systematically related to (though conceptually different from) Chierchia’s
theory of Attitudes De Se (Chierchia 1987).  In the logical syntax attitude verbs will be represented
roughly as follows6 (which is the logical form of an Amharic sentence):
(4) SAY<John,now,actually>ci be-a-hero (agent(ci), time(ci), world(ci))
 ↑
    context of the
        reported speech act
To put it somewhat sloppily, the context of the reported speech act is represented in the logical form
as a context variable (ci), bound by the attitude operator (analyzed here extensionally, as a universal
quantifier).  This will allow an indexical to depend either on the context of the actual speech act, as is
generally the case in English, or on the context of the reported speech act, as can happen in Amharic
(hence agent(ci), which picks out the agent of the context ci).  If correct, this theory will vindicate an
insight formulated by Israel & Perry 1996, who suggested (without empirical argument) that one
should expect attitude verbs to systematically violate the Fixity Thesis stated above.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. I first lay out the problem posed by indexicals
for a Fregean theory of Sense (Section 1), and then go on to discuss Kaplan’s solution as presented in
Demonstratives (Section 2). In order to eliminate inessential sources of inadequacy, an extensional
system is introduced in which Kaplan’s theory can be restated (Section 3).  It is then shown that
Kaplan’s theory is empirically inadequate because his semantics for attitude reports is insufficiently
fine-grained; and it is further demonstrated that the source of the problem lies in the prohibition
against monsters (Section 4). A solution is then offered, which follows (in simplified form) the
theory of Schlenker 1999 (Section 5). Two major stipulations of that theory are then criticized and
partially eliminated in the final parts of the paper  (Sections 6 and 7).
1 The Problem: Fregean ‘Senses’ and Indexicality
1.1 Frege’s notion of ‘Sense’
Frege’s notion of ‘Sense’ was designed to kill two birds with one stone.  It was supposed to
account both for the cognitive significance of unembedded sentences and for the truth-conditional
contribution of clauses embedded under an attitude operator.  Two sentences might thus have the
same value but differ in cognitive significance because they have different Senses. And by the same
token sentences with the same truth-value may still fail to be substitutable salva veritate under an
attitude operator if they do not share the same Sense.  On Frege’s view, then, it is for the same reason
that ‘The Morning Star is the Morning Star’ and ‘The Morning Star is the Evening Star’ don’t have
the same cognitive status even though they have the same truth-value; and that ‘John believes that
the Morning Star is the Morning Star’ can be true even when ‘John believes that the Morning Star is
the Evening Star’ is false.  In both cases ‘Sense’ is the key, which allows the cognitive significance
of a sentence and the truth-conditional contribution of an embedded clause to be strictly more fine-
grained than their mere ‘Reference’. (In Fregean parlance, this is because an element embedded
under an attitude verb has its ‘indirect’ rather than its normal reference.  And an element’s ‘indirect
reference’ is nothing but its normal Sense.)
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1 . 2  The Problem with Indexicals: Cognitive Significance and Truth-Conditional
Contribution
1.2.1  Cognitive Significance
Things become more complicated when indexicals are brought into the picture.  The first
observation is that the cognitive significance of a sentence containing indexicals may crucially
depend on its context-sensitivity. The following example, due to Kaplan, should suffice to convince
the reader:
(5)  ‘If I see, reflected in a window, the image of a man whose pants appear to be on fire, my
behavior is sensitive to whether I think, ‘His pants are on fire’, or ‘My pants are on fire’,
though the object of thought may be the same (i.e. the proposition expressed may be the same,
P.S.)’. (Kaplan 1990)
What Kaplan calls the ‘object of thought’ is what the sentence tells us about the world, or what I will
call its ‘objective Sense’.  In a possible worlds framework, the object of thought is just a proposition
(a set of possible worlds). Thus in Kaplan’s scenario ‘his pants are on fire’ and ‘my pants are on fire’
say the same thing about the world, characterized as a world in which Kaplan’s pants are on fire. The
difference, however, is that in the 1st person case it is asserted that the context of speech is one in
which the speaker’s pants are on fire; nothing similar is implied in the 3rd person case, which simply
indicates that the person who is pointed at is in that unfortunate situation.  Thus the two sentences
convey the same information about the world, but they say different things about the context of
speech. Kaplan’s example shows that the latter sort of information is crucial to the cognitive
significance of a sentence: I might stand to watch regretfully (or sadistically) in the 3rd person case,
but I am bound to take immediate action if my thought is in the 1st person. In other words, a sentence
doesn’t just tell us in which world we are situated, but also in which context of speech or thought we
are located. Although Kaplan doesn’t use the terminology7, this is just the De Se problem, as
described for instance by Lewis 1979; this, in turn, is identical to the ‘problem of the essential
indexical’ as discussed by Perry 1979. The conclusion is that indexicals are cognitively irreducible,
and that the notion of ‘Sense’ responsible for the cognitive significance of a sentence must itself be
indexical.
1.2.2 The Dilemma: abandon the unity of Frege’s Sense or abandon the Fixity Thesis
At this point two possibilities are open. We may preserve Frege’s insight, and conclude that
the Sense responsible for the truth-conditional contribution of an embedded clause is also irreducibly
indexical, contrary to common wisdom.  Alternatively, we may grant that the cognitive significance
of a sentence is given by an indexical Sense, but still maintain that the truth-conditional contribution
of an embedded clause is given by an objective Sense.  This means abandoning the unity of Frege’s
notion of ‘Sense’, a move advocated with considerable success in Kaplan’s Demonstratives. Frege’s
notion is then ramified into two components: an objective Sense (Kaplan’s ‘Content’), identified
with a set of possible worlds (a proposition), is responsible for the truth-conditional contribution of
embedded clauses; while an indexical Sense, which is strictly more fine-grained and is roughly
equivalent to Kaplan’s ‘Character’, is supposed to account for the cognitive significance of
unembedded sentences (in the above example, ‘My pants are on fire’ and ‘His pants are on fire’ have
the same Content, but different Characters).
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1.3 Two Theories
1.3.1 Kaplan’s Theory
On superficial inspection, there appears to be overwhelming support for Kaplan’s position.
First, since objective Senses are strictly less fine-grained than indexical Senses, Kaplan’s approach
predicts that the indexical nature of a direct discourse should systematically be lost in a report.
Specifically, attitude reports should not have the ability to distinguish between thoughts that have the
same objective Sense but different indexical Senses (in Kaplan’s terminology: between thoughts that
have different Characters but the same Content). The prediction appears to be borne out.  In the
foregoing scenario, the agent may have thought ‘My pants are on fire’ or ‘His pants are on fire’
(where ‘his’ refers to the agent himself), but both thoughts are reported in the same way: ‘Hei
thought that hisi pants were on fire’.
As was mentioned in the introduction, there is a second apparent argument in favor of
Kaplan’s position.  If an element embedded under an attitude verb could refer to its indexical rather
than to its objective Sense, a sentence such as ‘John thinks that I am a hero’ should have a reading on
which John’s belief is that he, John,  is a hero, contradicting both the Thesis and the facts of English.
The reasoning is that on Frege’s theory the Sense of the embedded clause is just the thought we
attribute to John.  Thus if the Sense is indexical, the thought could be indexical as well, and have the
form: ‘I am a hero’.  But this means that we would attribute to John the thought that John is a hero -
incorrectly, as it appears.  In fact, the empirical content of the Thesis is precisely that such readings
should never occur, since they would allow an indexical to be evaluated with respect to something
other than the context of the actual speech act.  Kaplan grants that operators that shift the context of
evaluation of an indexical are perfectly well-formed from a logical standpoint, but he claims that
such monstrous operators do not exist in English and could not even be added to it.
1.3.2 An alternative
An alternative is possible, however, which seeks to restore the unity of Frege’s notion of
Sense, and thus to challenge Kaplan’s theory.  In what follows I grant that the cognitive significance
of a sentence is given by an indexical Sense, but unlike Kaplan I posit that the truth-conditional
contribution of a clause embedded under an attitude verb is given by an indexical Sense as well8.
(This idea is discussed in von Stechow 1982, Lewis 1981 (‘Postscript to General Semantics’9), and
implemented in Chierchia 1987 and Heim 1991. It is conceptually related to -but technically very
different from-  Kuno 1972’s ‘direct discourse’ analysis of attitude reports).  In order to reach such a
conclusions, I deny Kaplan’s empirical premise, along the following lines.
First, I review arguments that show that the indexical nature of a thought or discourse can in
some cases be retained in a report.  Castañeda 1968 devised an artificial pronoun, ‘he*’, to represent
in reported speech the use of a 1st person in direct discourse.  Thus ‘Johni says that hei* is a hero’ is
Castañeda’s  way of reporting (in an artificial language) ‘I am a hero’ as uttered by John.  In case
John thought ‘He is a hero’, the report in Castañeda’s system simply becomes ‘Johni says that hei is a
hero’, without ‘he*’.  Castañeda called elements such as ‘he*’ ‘quasi-indicators’, to emphasize their
connection with ‘indicators’, or, in current terminology, ‘indexicals’ (in order to make the connection
completely explicit, I’ll henceforth use the term ‘quasi-indexicals’ rather than of ‘quasi-indicators’).
Kaplan’s empirical prediction is that quasi-indexicals could not exist in natural language.  But this is
incorrect.  Castañeda had already conjectured that ‘he himself’ can only be read as ‘he*’, and never
as ‘he’; and recent linguistic research has convincingly established that ‘he*’ does indeed exist in
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natural language,  under various guises (Morgan 1970; Mitchell 1986; Chierchia 1987; Kratzer 1997,
Kusumoto 1998).
The second part of the refutation lies in the demonstration that some indexicals can
systematically be shifted in attitude reports. As was mentioned in the introduction, the reading which
is excluded in English is systematically available in Amharic, where (literally) ‘John says that I am a
hero’ can mean that John thinks that he (John) is a hero10. Furthermore, it will be shown that similar
facts can be replicated within English, although in a different domain (that of temporal adverbials).
Shifted indexicals make the same semantic point as quasi-indexicals, since they show that the
indexical nature of a thought or discourse can in fact be retained in reported speech.  But unlike
quasi-indexicals they wear their indexicality on their sleeves, so to speak. And this provides a direct
rebuttal to Kaplan’s claim concerning the non-existence of monsters, and an important hint to the
correct theory.  As I will argue, in truth every attitude verb is a Kaplanian monster.
A particularly simple and elegant version of the present theory was developed within a modal
framework in von Stechow 2001 (cf. also Israel & Perry 1996).  I do not adopt it in the general case
because it is insufficiently expressive and requires numerous operations of covert movement for
which there is no syntactic evidence. However it is particularly well suited for a comparison with
Kaplan’s logic of demonstratives, of which it is a minimal (but monstrous) variation. In a nutshell,
the suggestion is that attitude operators manipulate a context parameter rather than a world
parameter. John says that φ is thus analyzed as: every context compatible with John’s claim is one in
which φ could be uttered truly. Von Stechow’s monstrous operator can be defined as follows, where
AssertmJ(t, w) is the set of contexts compatible with John’s assertion at t in w11:
(6) |=c, f, t, w SaymJ φ iff for all c’∈C such that c’∈AssertmJ(t, w):  |=c’, f, time(c’), world(c’) φ
(John says that φ is true in context c at time t in world w just in case every context compatible
with what John asserts at t in w is one in which φ could be uttered truly)
By contrast, on a standard modal analysis the attitude operator only manipulates a world parameter.
As a result,  John says that φ is taken to be true just in case φ is true in every world compatible with
John’s assertion (here AssertJ(t, w) is the set of worlds compatible with John’s assertion at t in w):
(7) |=c, f, t, w SayJ φ iff for all w’∈W s.t. w’∈AssertJ(t, w):  |=c, f, t, w’ φ
(John says that φ is true in context c at time t in world w just in case every world compatible
with what John asserts at t in w is one in which φ is true)
No context parameter is manipulated in the standard analysis, and thus no indexical may fail to be
evaluated with respect to the actual context. Such isn’t the case on the monstrous account. With a
standard definition of ‘I’ (‘I’ evaluated in a context c denotes the author of c), it is now predicted that
a first-person pronoun embedded under an attitude verb may fail to refer to the actual speaker. For
the Amharic first person (abbreviated as ‘IAmh’), this is the right result:
(8) |=c, f, t, w SaymJ hero(IAmh) iff for all c’∈C s.t. c’∈AssertJ(t, w):  |=c’, f, time(c’), world(c’) hero(IAmh)
(John says that IAmh am a hero is true in context c at time t in world w just in case every context
c’ compatible with what John asserts at t in w is such that: the author of c’ is a hero in the
world of c’ at the time of c’)12
Castañeda’s ‘he*’ (which corresponds to logophoric pronouns in natural language) can be given the
same semantic treatment, with the additional syntactic stipulation that it may only appear within the
scope of an attitude operator. English ‘I’ is the mirror-image of ‘he*’: it shares the same semantics
but can only  appear outside the scope of an attitude operator. ‘John says that I am a hero’ would thus
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 ‘f’ is an assignment function. It is necessary in order to treat ‘I x SaymJ hero(x)’ below.
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be analyzed in this system as ‘I x SaymJ hero(x)’, where ‘I’ has had to leap out of the scope of the
attitude operator by an operation of invisible movement; this allows it to be evaluated with respect to
the actual context, as it should be (such a movement won’t be necessary in the final version of the
system developed here).
2 Kaplan’s Theory: indexicals and indirect discourse
 Let us now turn to a more systematic discussion of the conceptual situation. In this section I
briefly summarize Kaplan’s well-known theory of indexicals, and then focus on his (less well-
known) theory of indirect discourse (from Kaplan 1989). I then modify the theory  to rid it of an
inessential inadequacy.  Both versions of Kaplan’s theory are criticized in the latter parts of the
paper.
2.1 Kaplan’s Analysis of Indexicals
2.1.1 Context and World Parameters in an Intensional Setting
In Demonstratives Kaplan seeks to offer  an account of the logic of indexicals, one that can
both explain why ‘I am here now’ is in some sense a priori true, even though ‘I am necessarily here
now’ is so obviously false.  Kaplan’s endeavor is framed within a standard modal logic, a point we’ll
modify for empirical reasons in Section 3.2.  Suffice it to say for the moment that Kaplan adds to the
standard world (or time) parameter of a modal logic a context parameter, which allows him to derive
the following results:
(9) a. ‘I am here now’ is a priori true because in all possible contexts c, ‘I am here now’ uttered in
c is true in c.   Formally:
for all contexts c, for all assignments f, |=c, f, time(c), world(c) I am here now
b. ‘Necessarily I am here now’ is not true.  Formally:
|=c, f, time(c), world(c) I am here now  iff for all w’ ∈ W s.t. world(c)Rw’  |=c, f, time(c), w’ I am here
now. But there are worlds w’ such that |≠c, f, time(c), w’ I am here now.
Once Kaplan’s system is set up in this (modal) fashion, a natural question is whether there are
any operators that can manipulate the context parameter c.  Formally, nothing prevents this, as is
demonstrated by von Stechow’s and Israel & Perry’s monstrous operator, defined in (6) above.  Still,
Kaplan claims that such operators do not and could not exist in English.  Here is his reasoning:
 Are there such operators as ‘In some contexts it is true that’, which when prefixed to a sentence yields a
truth if an only if in some context the contained sentence (not the content expressed by it) expresses a content that is
true in the circumstances of that context?  Let us try it:
(9) In some contexts it is true that I am not tired now.
For (9) to be true in the present context it suffices that some agent of some context not be tired at the time of that
context.  (9), so interpreted, has nothing to do with me or the present moment.  But this violates Principle 2!   [NB.
Principle 2 states that ‘Indexicals, pure and demonstrative alike, are directly referential’. P.S.]. Principle 2 can also
be expressed in a more theory laden way by saying that indexicals always take primary scope.  If this is true - and it
is - then no operator can control the character of the indexicals within its scope, because they will simply leap out of
its scope to the front of the operator.  I am not saying we could not construct a language with such operators, just
that English is not one.  And such operators could not be added to it.  (Kaplan 1989  p. 510)
Kaplan’s only empirical argument appears to be a generalization based on a single (but
representative) example, namely that the ‘operator’ ‘in some contexts it is true that’ cannot shift the
context of an indexical. To anticipate somewhat, here is what I will conclude about this argument:
Kaplan picked the wrong example. If he had selected an attitude operator (e.g. ‘John believes that...’)
instead of ‘in some contexts ...’, and if he had looked at Amharic instead of English, or alternatively
if he had stuck to English but looked at a different indexical (‘two days ago’ instead of ‘I’), he would
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have seen that monsters do exist. For the moment, however, let me review the consequences that
Kaplan draws from his observation.
2.1.2 Character and Content
In modal re-interpretations of Frege’s theory of Sense, attitude verbs are analyzed as modal
operators, while Senses are re-interpreted as intensions. Kaplan inherits this system, which he alters
to account for context-dependency.  In fact, the revision he advocates is rather minimal. True, the
logic must be enriched so as to encompass contexts.  But since the Principle of Direct Reference
prevents context parameters from being manipulated, once the context of the actual speech act is
fixed, everything remains as it used to be in a standard modal logic. As a consequence, the only
notion that is relevant for truth-conditional purposes given a fixed context is the ‘Content’ or
proposition expressed by a clause.
Of course, to account for the cognitive significance of a sentence context-dependency must
be taken into account. This is why Kaplan introduces the notion of a Character, which is just a
function from Contexts to Contents. The cognitive significance of an utterance (its ‘subjective
meaning’, to use the terminology of Haas-Spohn 1995) lies in what it asserts about the context in
which the speech act occurred. Although Kaplan does not elaborate on this point, the cognitive
significance is thus given by the diagonal of a Character χ, i.e. the set of contexts c such that χ
uttered at c is true in the world cw of c (the diagonal of χ is defined as: ∆(χ)=λc χ(c)(cw); see
Stalnaker 1978 and Haas-Spohn 1995).  In the end, then, the account is twofold: Characters (or
rather: the diagonals of Characters), which are indexical Senses, account for the cognitive
significance of a sentence. Contents (objective Senses) are used whenever a world parameter is
manipulated.  In particular, Contents are supposed to account for the truth-conditional contribution of
a clause embedded under an attitude operator.
2.2 Kaplan’s Analysis of Indirect Discourse
Because of the Prohibition Against Monsters, context parameters can never be shifted.  As a
result, attitude reports cannot be construed as relations between individuals and Characters, but only
as relations between individuals and Contents.  This is but the formal counterpart of the empirical
observation we made earlier (and will challenge shortly): two thoughts or discourses that differ in
Character but not in Content appear to be reported in the same way in indirect discourse.  Whether
the agent thinks ‘My pants are on fire’ or ‘His pants are on fire’, the report will be of the form: ‘Hei
thinks that hisi pants are on fire’.  And since Kaplan also maintains that attitudes (though not attitude
reports) are -irreducibly- relations between individuals and Characters rather than Contents, he must
conclude that the indexical nature of a thought is systematically lost in a report.
From this perspective, the challenge is to give an account of indirect discourse that explains
how an attitude report can be construed in terms of Contents even though the attitude itself is
analyzed in terms of Characters.  The solution is simply to provide a theory of indirect discourse that
makes attitude operators sensitive only to the Content, and never to the Character of the thought they
seek to report.  Kaplan sketches such a proposal in Demonstratives.  This attempt is important for
two reasons.  First, it shows that Kaplan’s theory of Characters and Contents can give a coherent
account of indirect discourse. Although the theory will be refuted, this will be on empirical, not
conceptual grounds.  Second, Kaplan’s theory of indirect discourse has the advantage of displaying
with great clarity the logical independence of two issues that are often confused in the linguistic
literature.  Often one (correctly) observes that (i) a thought or discourse is essentially indexical or
‘De Se’, and goes on to conclude without further argument that (ii) the report must be De Se as well.
But the conclusion simply does not follow. Proof: in Kaplan’s theory, the De Se nature of the
thought is granted, but the report can never be unambiguously De Se, although it is of course
compatible with a De Se situation.
Here, then, is Kaplan’s account of indirect discourse, which is buried in Paragraph 20 of
Demonstratives:
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What is special and different about the present approach is the attempt to use the distinction between direct and
indirect discourse to match the distinction between character and content. Thus when you wonder, ‘Is that me?’, it is
correct to report you as having wondered whether you are yourself. These transformations are traced to the indexical
form of your inner direct discourse rather than to any particular referential intentions.  The idea is that the full
analysis of indirect discourse includes mention of the suppressed character of the direct discourse event which the
indirect discourse reports, thus:
(i) ∃c, C [c is a context & C is a character  & x is the agent of c & x direct-discourse-verb C at the time t of c & the
content of C in c is that...]
approximates a full analysis of
(ii) x indirect-discourse-verb that ... at t.”  (Kaplan 1989  p. 554)
Consider again Kaplan’s own example: ‘My pants are on fire’ vs. ‘His pants are on fire’. In the
relevant context (with K. as the agent of both thoughts), these utterances (or thoughts) have the same
content, namely that K.’s pants are on fire. And they get reported in the same way: ‘K. says that his
pants are on fire.’  To simplify things, let us assume for a second that only two Characters with the
same Content could be asserted by the agent (the 1st person and the 3rd person ones).  In this special
case, Kaplan’s analysis gives the following truth-conditions:
(10)  ‘K.i says that hisi pants are on fire’ is true (at t* in w*)
iff K. asserts (at t* in w*) the Character of ‘My pants are on fire’ or  K. asserts (at t* in w*) the
Character of ‘His pants are on fire’ (with ‘his’ referring to K.).
But of course there could in principle be any number of Characters that yield the same Content in the
context of K.’s utterance.  In the general case, then, all we require for the report to be true is that
there be some Character satisfying the relevant conditions which is asserted by K.  This gives the
following truth-conditions, which involve an existential quantification over Characters that share the
same Content:
(11) ‘K.i says that hisi pants are on fire’ is true (at t* in w*)
iff there is a Character χ such that:
(i) the content of χ given the context of K.’s speech act (call it ‘c’) is that K’s pants are on fire
(i.e. χ(c)=λw K.’s pants are on fire in w), and
(ii) K. asserts χ (at t* in w*)
Kaplan’s theory is satisfactory given the facts we have seen so far.  It is compatible both with
what we know about (real-world) propositional attitudes (they are irreducibly indexical), and with
the linguistic form of attitude reports (indexical distinctions get collapsed in indirect discourse, and
indexicals can never be shifted).13  We will see below that the linguistic assumptions are empirically
                                                 
13
 It is instructive to look at a more subtle application of Kaplan’s theory.  Consider the following case:
(i) a. Heimson believes: ‘I am David Hume’
b. Heimson believes that he is David Hume
(ia) was one of the many arguments for an analysis of attitudes in terms of objects that are strictly more fine-grained than
propositions.  While Heimson is certainly wrong, he need not be irrational.  But if the objects of attitudes were
propositions, Heimson would have to believe the empty proposition (i.e. λw Heimson=Hume in w), and thus be irrational
- not a welcome result. The argument seems cogent when applied to thoughts or utterances.  But does it also go through
when applied to indirect discourse?  Consider (ib) again.  Using Kaplan’s analysis of Indirect Discourse, we obtain the
following result [c* is the context such that agent(c*)=Heimson, time(c*)=t*, world(c*)=w*]:
(ii)  ∃C [C is a character  & Heimson believes C at t* in w* & C(c*)=λw [Heimson=Hume w]]
Now it is indeed the case that this does not attribute irrationality to Heimson.  For although λw [Heimson=Hume w]=Ø,
there are non-empty Characters that yield precisely this when applied to the context of Heimson’s thought act.  In fact the
Character of ‘I am Hume’ has exactly this property:
(iii) a. Character of ‘I am Hume’: λc λw  author(c)=Hume in w
b. [λc λw  author(c)=Hume in w](c*)=[λw  Heimson=Hume in w] = Ø
Now surely it is not irrational to believe ‘I am Hume’, and it is clear that the corresponding Character is non-empty.
Still, there is an important problem with this solution (the problem was pointed out to me by Henk Zeevat; it is
discussed in Zimmermann 1991, pp. 206-207).  The analysis makes the incorrect prediction that ‘Heimson believes that
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incorrect: attitude reports can in fact preserve the indexical distinctions that are found in a direct
discourse, and furthermore indexicals can in some cases be shifted.  But before we can tackle these
issues,  we have to remove an independent source of inadequacy in Kaplan’s proposal.
3 An Extensional Framework
3.1 Intensional vs. Extensional Analyses
The independent problem is that Kaplan’s system is framed within a standard modal logic.
This has the advantage of making his proposal conceptually and technically simple.  But
unfortunately standard modal logic does not have the expressive means to model natural language
quantification over times and possible worlds, even independently of the issue of indexicality (this is
laid out in great detail in Cresswell 1990). Furthermore, the same point carries over to the
representation of attitude reports, at least on the assumption that these should be analyzed in modal
terms to begin with, that is, as a sort of (implicit) quantification over possible worlds (rather than in
quotational terms, for instance; I do not discuss the latter possibility in this paper). Kaplan’s system
inherits the expressive inadequacy of standard modal logic, and since issues of expressive power do
interact with the treatment of indexicality, the inadequacy must be removed before we can fully
analyze the relation between indexicality and attitude reports. This is particularly important because
our final theory would be extremely cumbersome to express in an intensional setting.
3.1.1 The trouble with a standard modal system (1): time and modality
Cresswell 1990 showed systematically that the full power of overt quantification over times
and possible worlds is needed to handle modal and temporal talk in natural language.  He considered
examples of increasing complexity, showing at each step how a modal logic had to be enriched to
handle them. Here are some examples, in which ‘F’, ‘P’ and ‘◊’ stand respectively for the past, future
and possibility operators in the purported (but incorrect) modal translations (b). In the extensional
translations, the values of t0 and w0 are contextually supplied as the time of utterance and the world
of utterance respectively:
(12) a. One day all persons now alive will be dead
b. # F∀x (alive x => dead x)
c. [∃t1: t1> t0] (∀x (alive(x, t0) => dead(x, t1)))
(13) a. Once everyone then alive would be dead
b. # PF∀x (alive x => dead x)
c. [∃t1: t1< t0]  [∃t2: t2> t1] (∀x (alive(x, t1) => dead(x, t2)))
                                                                                                                                                                     
he is Hume’ should be true if and only if ‘Heimson believes that he is Napoleon’ is true, since in both cases the
corresponding content is empty.  In order to solve this problem within the framework of Kaplan’s ‘Adding ‘Says’’, we
have to resort to the machinery of Kaplan’s‘Quantifying In’ and give the following logical form (c* stands for the
context of Heimson’s thought act.):
 (iii) ∃α1 ∃α2 ∃χ [R(α1, Heimson, c*) & R( α2, Hume, c*) & χ  is a character & χ(c*)= [λw Heimson=Hume in w]=Ø &
χ= λc λw [ιx: α1(x, c)]=[ιx: α2(x, c)] in w & Heimson believes χ at time(c*) in world(c*)]
where R(α1, Heimson, c*) means that α1  is a vivid description of Heimson for the agent of c* at the time of c* in the
world of c*.
The results of this analysis are as follows:
(a) It is possible to distinguish between ‘Heimson believes he is Hume’ (true) and ‘Heimson believes he is Napoleon’
(false). The latter is false because Heimson does not believe any character of the form λc λw [ιx: α1(x, c)]=[ιx: α2(x, c)],
where [ιx: α1(x, c)] happens to pick out Heimson in the actual world while [ιx: α2(x, c)] picks out Napoleon.
(b) On the other hand, Kaplan’s basic insight is preserved: it is impossible to distinguish between a situation in which
Heimson believes: ‘I am Hume’, and one in which he believes ‘He is Hume’, even if ‘he’ happens to refer to Heimson
himself.
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(14) a. It might have been that every person actually rich was poor
b. # ◊∀x (rich x => poor x)
c. [∃w1: w0R w1] (∀x (rich(x, w0) => poor(x,  w1)))
As can be seen, the purported modal translations are semantically inadequate, in that in each
case the innermost formula ends up contradictory, contrary to speakers’ judgments. The problem is
that a modal operator shifts the point of evaluation of every element that appears in its scope. But
there are numerous examples in natural language in which an element that is within the syntactic
scope of a modal operator is not semantically dependent upon it, as is seen in the preceding
examples.  Furthermore, even if one were to postulate that the relevant items can leap out of the
scope of the operator by an operation of covert syntactic movement, a standard modal solution would
still be inadequate on semantic grounds.  This is because a standard modal system is strictly less
expressive than a logic with full quantification over times and worlds.  But since the entire
expressive power of the latter is needed to handle modal and temporal talk, there can be no
motivation for using a standard modal system.
Because Cresswell wanted to stick to the syntax of modal logic, he refrained from resorting to a
system with world and time variables. Rather, he enriched his initial modal logic with new operators
(somewhat similar to those used in Quine’s ‘Variables Explained Away’). The final result was
expressively equivalent to an extensional logic with full quantification over time and world variables.
Although Cresswell’s discussion is convincing, a simpler proof of the same expressive results can be
provided.  The technique was first used by Boolos 1984 in his study of plurals in relation to 2nd order
logic.  Boolos wanted to show that, due to the existence of plurals, English has at least the expressive
power of (monadic) 2nd order logic.  To administer the proof, he provided a recursive translation
procedure from 2nd order logic into English.  In this fashion, every 2nd order sentence was given an
English counterpart which was true in exactly the same models – which showed that English had at
least the expressive power of 2nd order logic.  Applying the same technique, we can show that a
subpart of English that includes only temporal or modal talk (what I call ‘Temporal’ and ‘Modal’
English, respectively) has at least the expressive power of 1st order (polyadic) logic. The interested
reader is referred to Appendix I  for details.
A word might be in order to explain why such a proof can be given at all.  The reason is that
Temporal and Modal English both have a counterpart of the expressive tools of 1st order logic,
namely:
(i) Unary and binary connectives (‘It is not the case that’ or simply ‘not’; ‘and’, ‘or’)
(ii) 1st order quantifiers: ‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’ for Modal English, ‘always’ and ‘sometimes’
for Temporal English
(iii) Variables
The translation of variables (iii) is the only point of some subtlety: it is because natural language has
time and world variables that world and time predicates of any arity can be constructed, and thus that
any formula of 1st order logic can be translated.  This, in turn, is necessary to construct a systematic
translation from polyadic 1st order logic to Temporal or Modal English.  Without the device of
variables, we might be stuck with a system that is strictly less expressive14
(this is the case of standard modal logic, which is expressively equivalent to a proper subpart of 1st
order logic that contains a single dyadic predicate of worlds -the ‘accessibility relation’ between
worlds- and any number of monadic world predicates15).  But Partee 1973 noted that tenses share a
                                                 
14
 As an anonymous reviewer points out, the expressive superiority of explicit quantification over systems with implicit
parameters does not hold for higher-order logics.
15
 This is the case only when modal logic is interpreted with satisfaction/validity in a model (Definitions: Let M=<W, R,
V> be a model, where W is a set of worlds, R an accessibility relation, and V a valuation. ϕ is valid in the model M iff
for every world w of W, VM, w(φ)=1. ϕ is valid in the frame F iff for every world w of W and for any valuation V, VM,
w(φ)=1. With satisfaction/validity in a frame, modal logic is equivalent to a fragment of 2nd order logic). A systematic
translation procedure can be found in van Benthem 1983 or in Blackburn et al. 2001.
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number of the interpretive properties of pronouns; in particular, tenses, just like pronouns, can
behave as bound variables16. Stone 1997 further suggested that, in similar fashion, moods can be
construed as modal pronouns; and they too can be treated as bound variables. The results mentioned
above (temporal and modal English have at least the expressive power of 1st order logic) follow
directly from these linguistic observations, since they give a way to provide a systematic translation
for variables.  Note, however, that considerably less than Partee’s and Stone’s full thesis is needed to
get this result.  If you don’t believe that tenses and moods can be bound (long-distance), just consider
the word ‘then’, in its temporal and modal uses17:
(15) a. When John comes, then Mary is always happy
b. [∀t: John comes at t] (Mary is happy at t)
(16) a. If John comes, then Mary will necessarily be happy
b. [∀w: John comes at w] (Mary is happy in w)
What is crucial, of course, is that there should be no locality constraints on the binding of ‘then’. For
simplicity the Appendix relies on ‘then’ rather than just tense or mood to define the recursive
translations between 1st order logic and Temporal or Modal English18.
A final point is that the translation procedures discussed here (and implemented in the
Appendix) lend themselves to an extension to Generalized Quantifiers.  Thus I would suggest that
the same proofs can be used to show that Temporal and Modal English have at least the power of a
1st order logic with generalized quantifiers.  Since the matter has been investigated at great length by
others (see Kratzer  1991 for references), and is of no immediate consequence to the study of attitude
reports, I leave it aside in what follows.
3.1.2 The trouble with a standard modal system (2): attitude reports
A final point is that  the results of the preceding section generalize to attitude verbs, which in
the modal tradition are analyzed as operators that manipulate a world parameter. Since in the modal
case the full power of quantification over possible worlds is needed, we can expect the same to hold
of attitude verbs as well.  And this does appear to be the case, although the argument is a little harder
to make.  My goal in this section is to show that if attitude verbs are construed as manipulating world
parameters (or anything else, for that matter), then this should be done within a system that has at
least the power of full quantification over possible worlds19 (or whatever it is that is actually
quantified over; I will show later that the elements that are quantified over are contexts rather than
possible worlds, but this is conceptually and technically a different point.)
Things are more complicated than in the modal and in the temporal case, both because the
variables are implicit rather than explicit (cf. ‘then’ in the previous examples), and also because it is
                                                 
16
 Partee partly retracted her claim in Partee 1984.
17
 For reasons that I do not understand, ‘then’ is not licensed unless it is preceded by a restrictive ‘when’- or ‘if’-clause.
Since such clauses don’t hurt, I include them in the recursive translation procedure, but I make them semantically
harmless by having them express a trivial truth, e.g. ‘0=0’. Note also that ‘then’ makes a pragmatic contribution which I
disregard in this study. See Iatridou 1994 for an analysis.
18
 This procedure justifies the use of overt time and world variables,  since the full expressive power of a variable-full
system is needed to formalize temporal and modal talk in natural language.  What we have not shown, however, is that
this is the only way such expressive power could be achieved.  And for good reason, since the expressive power of 1st
order logic can be achieved in a variable-free system as well (cf. Quine 1960 and Kuhn 1980). Since the point I wish to
make is semantic rather than syntactic in nature, I am happy to use overt variables in my Logical Forms, although the
reader may remain agnostic as to the syntactic reality of variables in natural language (see Jacobson 1999 for a recent
defense of variable-free semantics.)
19
 An independent argument for the same conclusion was given in Heim 1991a. There the observation was that restrictors
of quantifiers must be allowed to scope out of modal contexts - a fact which was already noted in Farkas’s work (e.g.
Farkas 1997). The claim was that these restrictors do not move syntactically, but are indexed with a time or a world
quantifier that may appear arbitrarily far up in the tree. An anonymous reviewer informs me that similar considerations
are found in Bäuerle 1983.
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not easy to find an attitude verb that does not involve an accessibility relation (e.g. ‘believe’ does not
quantify over all worlds (or contexts) but only over those that are compatible with the agent’s
beliefs).  As in the previous case, I have relegated the discussion of the translation procedure to
Appendix I.  For present purposes the important point is that Attitudinal English (English with only
attitude verbs as quantifiers) does appear to have the resources we need for the translation, namely:
(i) Unary and Binary connectives (‘it is not the case that’, ‘and’)
(ii) Quantifiers - for instance ‘he believes that’, analyzed as a universal quantifier over possible
worlds (John believes that φ is true iff every world compatible with John’s belief satisfies φ. The
difficulty discussed in Appendix I is that this is an instance of restricted rather than unrestricted
quantification).
(iii) Variables, which unfortunately are not explicitly represented.  That they are semantically present
can be seen in the standard analysis of sentences such as the following:
(17) a. John believes that it rains more than it actually does
b. [∀w: B(w)(w*)] ([ιd: rain(d, w)] > [ιd: rain(d, w*)])
(17)a. receives the analysis in (17)b., where B(w)(w*) abbreviates: ‘w is compatible with what John
believes in w*’.  (17)b is of the form ‘[∀w: B(w)(w*)] Rww*’, which clearly involves a polyadic
world predicate.  It so happens that in this case w*  is a free variable - on standard analyses, it simply
denotes the actual world.  But this is an inessential feature of this example.  It suffices to embed the
entire sentence under another attitude verb to obtain a polyadic world predicate whose two variables
are both bound by an attitude quantifier:
(18) a. Mary claims that John believes that it rains more than it does.
b. [∀w: C(w)(w*)][∀w’: B(w’)(w)] ([ιd: rain(d, w’)] > [ιd: rain(d, w)])
 [‘C(w)(w*)’ abbreviates: ‘w is compatible with what Mary claims in w*’]
3.2 An Extensional System.
3.2.1 Adding time and world variables
In order to address the expressive power problem, I lay out an enriched version of Kaplan’s
logic, one that involves overt quantification over times and worlds (as well as over individuals, of
course). ‘Always’ and ‘necessarily’ are treated as time and world quantifiers [restricted and
generalized quantification could be added easily if one so wished]:
(19)  [[∀x φ]]s =1 iff for every object X, [[φ]]s[x->X] = 1
(20) [[Nec w φ]] s =1 iff for every world W, [[φ]]s[w->W] = 1
(21) [[Alw t φ]] s =1 iff for every moment T, [[φ]]s[t->T] = 1
The logic is sorted, with variables of the form x1,...,  (individual variables), t1, ..., (time variables),
and w1, ....  (world variables). Given Kaplan’s Prohibition Against Monsters, context-dependency
can be treated entirely in the meta-language.  Indexicals such as ‘I’, ‘now’, ‘actually’ are given the
following lexical entries, where cA, cT and cw refer to the agent, time and world of c respectively (see
Appendix II, A. for details):
(22) a. [[I]] s, c = cA
b. [[now]] s, c = cT
c. [[actually]] s, c = cW
The Logical Form of ‘I actually exist now’ is represented as follows:
(23) [[exist(I, now, actually)]]c, s=1 iff <cA, cT, cW>∈I(exist) which is true for every context c.
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By contrast, ‘I necessarily exist now’ involves universal quantification over possible worlds, and is
not true in every context:
(24) [[Nec wi exist(I, now, wi)]]c, s=1 iff for all w∈W, [[exist(I, now, wi)]]c, s[wi−>w]=1, iff  for all
w∈W <cA, cT, w>∈I(exist),  which does not have to be true.
3.2.2 Restatement of Kaplan’s Theory
This is essentially enough to re-state Kaplan’s theory within an extensional system. All we
still need  is a semantic rule for ‘say’, which is provided below:
(25) [[SAY<α’, β’, γ’> γφ]] c, s=1 iff there exists a Character k in K(<[[α’]]c, s, [[β’]]c, s, [[γ’]]c, s>) [=the
set of Characters asserted by α’ at time β’ in world γ’] such that
(i) k(<[[α’]]c, s, [[β’]]c, s, [[γ’]]c, s>)= λw[[φ]] c, s[γ−>w]
(ii) [[α’]]c, s asserts k at [[β’]]c, s in [[γ’]]c, s
A simple logic for this extensional version of Kaplan’s system is presented in  Appendix II A.  For
future reference, we now develop a more complete treatment of pronouns, tense and mood, which
will be crucial for our final theory.
3.2.3 The treatment of pronouns
In the case of ‘I’, the reference of the pronoun is unambiguously determined by a given
coordinate of the context (in this sense ‘I’ is a pure indexical).  But such is not always the case. If
there are several hearers, ‘you’ (in the singular) may be used in the same sentence to refer to
different individuals. In such cases a demonstration typically completes the sentence:
(26)  You [pointing] are elected, but you [pointing] are not.
If a 3rd person pronoun is used, anyone can be referred to who is not known to be either the speaker
or the hearer of the current speech act:
(27) I’ve already met him [pointing] and him [pointing], though not her [pointing].
Clearly, in both types of examples the reference of the pronouns cannot be recovered from a given
coordinate of the context, at least if the context is simply construed as a tuple of the form <author,
(hearer), time of utterance, world of utterance>. Still, the context does constrain (although it does not
ambiguously determine) the reference of these pronouns.
Two questions should be resolved:
(a) How should we handle pronouns whose reference cannot be recovered from a coordinate of the
context?
(b) How should we analyze the constraints on reference that are introduced by context-sensitive
features in these cases?
(a) In his ‘Advice on Modal Logic’, Dana Scott suggested that pronouns used demonstratively
should be treated as free variables, whose value is given by an assignment function. Several
contemporary researchers (e.g. Larson & Segal 1995, following Burge 1974 and Weinstein 1974;
see also Higginbotham 2000) have observed that this isn’t quite enough, since the theory must
specify that the assignment function in question correctly captures the referential intentions of the
speaker. This may be done by simply requiring that the original assignment function be properly
determined by the context. Thus if the speaker meant to refer to John by ‘he2’, s(2) should be John.
 We may stipulate that the assignment function with respect to which a sentence is initially
evaluated must be ‘determined’ by the context, in the sense that it properly represents the referential
intensions of the speaker at the time and in the world of his utterance:
(28) Compatibility Condition
s is an assignment determined by c only if s properly represents the referential intentions of cA
at cT in cW
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 (b) How should the constraints on the reference of ‘you’ or ‘I’ be analyzed? As it turns out,
almost nothing needs to be added beyond what is already necessary for the treatment of other
grammatical features, such as gender. Cooper 1983 suggested that gender features contribute a
presupposition that constrains the value of a pronoun under the relevant assignments. The same
mechanism carries over to indexical features such as 1st and 2nd person.
Consider the case of gender features first.  Within the present framework, Cooper’s suggestion
would be that ‘She is clever’ (used demonstratively) should receive the following analysis (I leave
out time and world variables, and use in a’. a notation where presuppositions are written between
curly brackets, as in Appendix II. C):
(29) a. Shei is elected
a’. LF: be-elected (xi{+feminine(xi)})
b. Assertion: s(xi) is clever
c. Presupposition: s(xi) is female
d. Compatibility: s is determined by the context of utterance c.
The advantage of Cooper’s system is that it extends straightforwardly to bound pronouns, and
predicts interesting facts of presupposition projection. Using a standard rule of presupposition
projection in universally quantified structures, Cooper’s system (also applied in Heim & Kratzer
1998) explains why in the following sentence all the directors in the domain of discourse must be
women:
(30) a. [Every director]i [ti likes heri mother].
b. Assertion:  For all x such that [[director]]s(x)=1, [[ti likes heri mother]]s[i->x]=1
c. Presupposition: For all x such that [[director]]s(x)=1, x is female.
d. Compatibility: s is determined by the context of utterance c.
Each assignment that satisfies the restrictor must satisfy the presuppositions of the nuclear scope,
which directly derives the result20.
Let us now extend this system to person features. A simple sentence with two occurrences of
‘you’ is represented as follows, where {+hearer*(xi)} renders the presupposition that xi is a hearer of
the speech act (again, I disregard time and modality; a complete treatment is offered in Appendix II,
C.):
(31) a. Youi are elected, but youm are not.
a’. LF: elected(xi{+hearer*(xi)}) ∧ ¬elected(xm{+hearer*(xm)})
b. Assertion: [[(b)]]s, c=1 iff s(xi) is elected and s(xm) is not elected, which may both be true if
s(xi)≠ s(xm)
c. Presupposition: s(xi), s(xm) are hearers of the actual speech act
d. Compatibility: s is determined by the context of utterance c.
On this view there is no reason indexical pronouns couldn’t be used as bound variables, since all the
1st or 2nd person features do is constrain the value of the variables under particular assignments. As
expected, such a case does in fact arise, as was observed in Heim 1991 (with different examples,
which are discussed later in this paper). Consider the following plural sentence:
(32) You (all) respect your wives
The most plausible reading is distributive, and thus crucially involves a bound possessive pronoun.
The presupposition of the 2nd person pronoun does not lead to ungrammaticality, since the variable
                                                 
20
 See Heim 1988 and Kadmon 2001, chapter 10, for an analysis of presupposition projection in quantified structures.
Note that Appendix II C. should be extended to account for ‘Every director likes her mother’. This is because for
simplicity I have made quantification over individuals unrestricted. The extension to restricted quantification is relatively
straightforward.
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does in fact ranger over hearers.21  Similarly it can be shown that a 1st person pronoun can be used as
a bound variable. The examples in Heim 1991 involved the focus particle ‘only’ (‘Only I did my
homework’, which has a reading which entails that Peter didn’t do his homework). Ellipsis can also
be used to make the point: ‘I did my homework. Peter did too’ has a reading on which Peter did his
homework. Given standard assumptions concerning ellipsis, this suggests that the first conjunct has a
bound variable reading as well (this reading is analyzed in detail in Appendix II C).22
Finally, let us consider in greater detail how gender and indexical features apply to plural
pronouns.  The preceding remarks can be extended to this case by (i) treating plural individuals as
sums of singular individuals, and (ii) generalizing the constraints introduced above to the plural case.
I start with the French pronominal system, which has the advantage of displaying more
morphological distinctions in the plural than its English counterpart.  First, consider ‘ils’, the
masculine plural pronoun.  It may denote any sum of individuals as long as one of its members is
non-female. In the simplest case, where ‘ils’ is used deictically, this gives rise to the following
conditions (where Xi ranges over sums of individuals):
(33) a. Ilsi sont élus.
   Theyi-M. Pl. are elected
a’. LF: be-elected (Xi{-feminine(Xi)})
b. Assertion: the members of s(Xi)  are elected
c. Presupposition: one member of s(Xi) is non-female.
d. Compatibility: s is determined by the context of utterance c.
The same treatment can be applied when ‘ils’ has split antecedents, except that a sum of singular
individuals will now appear explicitly in the Logical Form (‘eux’ is the strong form of ‘ils’):
(34) a. Chaque garçon a donné à chaque fille une photo d’eux
  [Each boy]i has given to [each girl]k a picture of themi+k-M. Pl.
a’. LF: [∀xi: boy(xi)][∀xk: girl(xk)] (gave-a-picture-of (xi, xk, xi+xk {-feminine(xi+xk)})
b. Assertion: for each boy b and each girl g, b gave g a picture of the plural individual bg.
c. Presupposition: for each boy b and for each girl g, one member of s[xi ->b, xk->g](xi+xk), i.e.
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 The representation is presumably something like the following (using the notation of Heim & Kratzer 1998):
(i) a. You  (all) [λX [∀x: x∈X] x respect yourx’s wife]
b. [[[λX [∀x: x∈X] x respect yourx’s wife]]]s, c = λΞ: Ξ is a group and [[[∀x: x∈X] x respect yourx’s wife]]s[X-
>Ξ], c
 is defined . [[[∀x: x∈X] x respect yourx’s wife]]] s[X->Ξ], c
We then apply to the definedness condition standard rules of presupposition projection and obtain the following result :
 (ii) λΞ: Ξ is a group and every ξ in Ξ is a hearer of c. [[[∀x: x∈X] x respect yourx’s wife]]] s[X->Ξ], c
By functional application, this can be applied to the plural subject ‘you’ without yielding a presupposition failure.
The same point could have been made with simpler examples by considering cases of VP-ellipsis, which can be
used to determine whether a pronoun is bound or not:
(iii) –Youi λtm [tm like yourm parents]
- Youk do too  λtm [tm like yourm parents]
Note that the above example shows (i) that the 2nd person possessive pronoun can be interpreted as a bound variable, and
(ii) that in the antecedent the bound pronoun does satisfy the requirement that it should range only over hearers. On Heim
& Kratzer’s implementation, the function in (iii) is partial, with the value:
 (iv) λx: x is a hearer. [tm like yourm parents]s[m->x]
Function application can then be applied  without difficulty, since the argument ‘youi’ does in fact refer to a hearer of the
speech act. See Appendix II C. for a different implementation of the bound variable reading (without lambdas).
22
 Two questions should be distinguished in the analysis of the bound variable reading of  ‘Ix [tx did myx homework], and
Peter did too’. (i) Are the 1st person features of ‘my’ interpreted in the antecedent? The present theory claims that they
may be, because the rule of presupposition projection is automatically satisfied anyway (since ‘myx’ only has to be
evaluated under an assignment on which ‘x’ denotes the speaker) (ii) Are the 1st person features of ‘my’ interpreted after
ellipsis resolution in the consequent? If ellipsis is resolved by copying, the answer must be ‘no’: ‘Peterx [ tx did myx
homework]’ would immediately result in a presupposition failure (note that exactly the same facts hold of bound ‘she’).
See paragraph 7.1 for further discussion.
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one member of  bg, is non-female.
d. Compatibility: s is determined by the context of utterance c.
Once these conditions are in place for gender, essentially nothing needs to be added for
indexical features. ‘We’ is formally analogous to ‘ils’ except that the condition is now that the plural
individual it denotes should have the speaker  as one of its members:
(35) a. We are elected
a’. LF: be-elected (Xi{+author*(Xi)})
b. Assertion: the members of s(Xi)  are elected
c. Presupposition: one member of s(Xi) is the speaker of the context c.
d. Compatibility: s is determined by the context of utterance c.
Following the same logic, cases of split antecedents for ‘we’ can be handled as well, as in the
following (simplified) example:
(36) a. Each of my former wives remembers our fights
a’. LF: [∀xi: former-wife(xi)](remembers-the-fights-of(xi, xi+xk {+author*(xi+xk)}))
b. Assertion: for each of my former wives f, f remembers the fights of fs(xk).
c. Presupposition:  for each of my former wives f, one member of the plural individual s[xi -
>p](xi+xk), i.e. one member of  ps(xk), is the speaker of the context c.
d. Compatibility: s is determined by the context of utterance c.
At first sight it might appear that examples such as this require the context to be manipulated in such
a way that ‘us’ may denote different plural individuals. But on the present analysis this is not
required, since only quantification over individuals is involved, just as was the case in the analysis of
‘ils’. This is important because it has sometimes been claimed that more complex versions of this
example require some kind of ‘context shift’. Although I do claim that context shift is needed in
some cases, I deny that this is one of them23.
3.2.4 Extension to tense and mood
This system can be extended to tense and mood. For our purposes it will suffice to assume that
the present tense and the indicative each have a  ‘point’ reading: ‘+present*’ is a (context-dependent)
predicate, which is true only of the time of utterance; and ‘+indicative1*’ is true only of the world of
utterance (we will later add a second reading for the indicative, ‘+indicative2*’, which is necessary to
handle indicative conditionals).
(37) a. For every time variable t, [[t {+present*(t)}]]s, c is defined only if s(t) is cT.  If so,
[[t{+present*(t)}]]s, c =s(t).
b. For every world variable w, [[w {+indicative1*(w)}]]s, c is defined only if s(w) is cW.  If so,
[[w {+indicative1*(w)}]]s, c =s(w).
We do preserve the result that ‘I exist’ is true whenever it can be uttered felicitously24; and that ‘It is
necessary that I exist’ can be false, at least if we stipulate that no indicative mood appears on the
verb embedded under ‘it is necessary that’:
                                                 
23
 (ia) below is due to Partee 1989 and (ib) was suggested by an anonymous reviewer. Both examples are a more
complex version of (36) in that they involve donkey anaphora. Any theory of donkey anaphora could presumably be
added to the present analysis to handle these cases (in fact, if a DRT-style theory is used, nothing needs to be added since
pronouns can be given their standard treatment; things are more complicated on an E-type theory).
(i) a. John often comes over for Sunday brunch. Whenever someone else comes over too, we (all) end up playing
trios. (Otherwise we play duets).
b. Every time I get together with a linguist, we argue.
24
 In Appendix II C the indicative [written there as +indicative1*(wl, c*)] is treated as a shiftable indexical. But the results
of this section are preserved.
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(38) a. ‘I exist’ is true whenever it is uttered felicitously.
b. exist(xi{+author*(xi)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1*(wl)})
b. [[(b)]]c, s=# iff s(xi)≠cA or s(tk)≠cT or s(wl)≠cW. If ≠#, [[(b)]]c, s=1 iff the agent cA exists at the
time cT in the world cW, which is true by stipulation.
(39) a. ‘It is necessary that I exist’ may be uttered felicitously and be false.
b.Nec wl exist(xi{+author*(xi)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl)
c. [[(b)]]c, s=# iff s(xi)≠cA or s(tk)≠cT.  If ≠#, [[(b)]]c, s=1 iff for all w∈W, the agent cA exists at
the time cT in the world w, which is unlikely to be the case.
4 Refutation of the Standard Theory
I now come to the refutation of Kaplan’s theory.  First, I review results that show that
Kaplan’s theory of indirect discourse is not sufficiently fine-grained to model indirect discourse in
natural language.  Semantically, it is shown that the expressive power of quantification over contexts
rather than just quantification over possible worlds is needed.  And since each context determines a
single world (=the world of that context), while the converse is not true, quantification over contexts
will of course allow for a finer semantics than mere quantification over worlds.  Second, I adduce
new data (‘new’ in the sense that they haven’t been much discussed in the semantic literature,
although they have been known for a long time in the typological literature) that suggest that,
morpho-syntactically, quantification over contexts is also needed since some indexicals appear to be
evaluated with respect to the context of the reported rather than of the actual speech act. Together,
these observations will build a strong case against Kaplan’s theory of indirect discourse, and in favor
of the monster-based alternative that I lay out in Section 5.
4.1 Semantic Refutation: some attitude reports can convey indexical distinctions
In a nutshell, the purely semantic refutation of Kaplan’s theory proceeds by showing that two
thoughts or discourses that express the same Content but different Characters can sometimes be
semantically distinguished in a report.  This contradicts Kaplan’s empirical prediction, which is that
only Contents and never Characters should be of any linguistic relevance for indirect discourse.
4.1.1 Attitudes De Se vs. Reports of Attitudes De Se
Two problems should be distinguished at the outset.  One is the problem of the ‘essential
indexical’, or of ‘attitudes De Se’, as it has been discussed by Perry, Lewis and many others.  This is
a problem about attitudes, not attitude reports. It can be stated either in terms of thought, or in terms
of the cognitive significance of sentences. In the first case, one will ask: how fine-grained are
thoughts?  Are there essential indexicals in thought? In the second case, the question becomes: how
fine-grained are discourses?  Are there essential indexicals in language?  On either construal the
argument is the same, and the answer is positive: there are essential indexicals in language and in
thought. This, of course, is just a more general version of our earlier conclusion that the diagonal of
a Character rather than a Content accounts for the cognitive significance of sentences.  There are
many ways to make this point. I'll just cite Perry and Lewis on this matter:
“An amnesiac, Rudolf Lingens, is lost in the Stanford library.  He reads a number of things in the library, including a
biography of himself, and a detailed account of the library in which he is lost... He still won’t know who he is, and where
he is, no matter how much knowledge he piles up, until that moment when he is ready to say, “This place is aisle five,
floor six, of Main Library, Stanford.  I am Rudolf Lingens.” [Perry 1977]
Lewis comments:
“It seems that the Stanford library has plenty of books, but no helpful little maps with a dot marked “location of this
map.”  Book learning will help Lingens locate himself in logical space.  (...)  But none of this, by itself, can guarantee
19
that he knows where in the world he is.  He needs to locate himself not only in logical space but also in ordinary space”.
[Lewis 1979 p. 138]
From these observations, however, nothing follows concerning the representation of attitude
reports in natural language. There is no reason to assume that attitude reports should be as fine-
grained as attitudes, and superficially it seems that precisely when indexicality is concerned they are
not as fine-grained (both ‘My pants are on fire’ and ‘His pants are on fire’ can be reported with: ‘K.i
believes that hisi pants are on fire’.) It was in fact a great virtue of Kaplan’s analysis to show that the
two questions are independent: thoughts or direct discourses are as fine-grained as Characters,
Kaplan argued, but still a report can only be as fine-grained as a content. This has some apparently
counterintuitive consequences, but on second thought they are rather well-motivated from a
linguistic standpoint, as was observed above (‘... when you wonder, ‘Is that me?’, it is correct to
report you as having wondered whether you are yourself.’ (Kaplan 1989, p. 554)).
4.1.2 Castañeda’s ‘he*’ and ‘he himself’
Starting from the observation that a report often fails to convey indexical distinctions,
Castañeda 1968 devised an artificial pronoun, ‘he*’, to be used solely in a report to indicate that the
world ‘I’ had been used in the original discourse. If the original thought was in the 1st person (‘My
pants are on fire’), the report will involve ‘he*’: ‘Kaplan believed that his* pants were on fire’.  If
the thought didn’t involve ‘I’ (‘His pants are on fire’), the report won’t contain ‘he*’: ‘Kaplani
thought that hisi pants were on fire’.
It was probably assumed even in Castañeda’s time that ‘he*’ had some natural language
counterparts, for instance the expression ‘he himself’.  Furthermore, Anscombe 1975 suggested that
the ‘indirect reflexives’ of Ancient Greek and Latin are in fact the precise counterpart of ‘he*’ - a
point which is not entirely correct since, unlike ‘he*’, they apparently occurred outside of attitude
reports (this point is discussed in some detail in Clements 1975).  But a detailed empirical study of
these matters came only later.
4.1.3 Clements 1975 and Ewe logophoric pronouns
The remarkable discovery was that ‘he*’ does in fact exist in natural language.  The first
great study of this phenomenon was conducted by Clements 197525.  Summarizing cross-linguistic
data, Clements characterized logophoric pronouns as elements that satisfy conditions (i)-(iii)
(Clements 1975 p. 171):
“(i) logophoric pronouns are restricted to reportive contexts  transmitting the words or thought of an individual or
individuals other than the speaker or narrator”;
(ii) the antecedent does not occur in the same reportive context as the logophoric pronoun;
(iii) the antecedent designates the individual or individuals whose words or thoughts are transmitted in the reportive
context in which the logophoric pronoun occurs.”
Clements’s characterization is remarkably similar to Castañeda’s definition  of ‘he*’  - a point which
is all the more striking since Clements (a noted phonologist) apparently did not know of Castañeda’s
work when he wrote his study26.
                                                 
25
 A similar topic was investigated in Hagège 1974, which gave ‘logophoric’ pronouns their name (literally, these are
‘pronouns that carry discourse’).  Since Clements’s study is considerably more detailed and displays a high level of
analytical clarity, it is the one I discuss in what follows.
26
 For comparison, here is the definition of ‘he*” in Castañeda 1968 (I have adapted expressions between brackets):
“... the attribution of self-knowledge is made by means of the third-person pronoun ‘he (himself)’ to be abbreviated
‘he*’, which has here the following characteristics:
(i) it does not express an indexical reference made by the speaker;
(ii) it appears in oratio obliqua;
(iii) it has an antecedent, namely [the agent of the report],   to which it refers back;
(iv) its antecedent is outside the oratio obliqua  containing ‘he*’;
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The hypothesis that logophoric pronouns are simply quasi-indexicals was not made by
Clements, presumably because he was not aware of the literature on quasi-indexicals and attitudes
De Se. However the connection between the two issues did not escape later researchers, among
others Heim 1991 and Pan 1997. But although Clements’s description of Ewe logophoric pronouns is
highly reminiscent of  ‘he*’, he did not provide the crucial semantic judgments that would have
proven conclusively that they are actually one and the same thing.  As was mentioned above, ‘he*’
differs from a non-starred ‘he’ by its distribution, since the former occurs only in attitude reports,
while the latter can occur everywhere.  But it also differs in its interpretation: whenever it is used, it
attributes to the holder/agent of the attitude an indexical reference to him- or herself. If Kaplan
thought: ‘My pants are on fire’, the report will be: ‘Kaplani thought that hisi* pants were on fire’, but
if his belief was of the form: ‘His pants are on fire’, the report will not include a star: ‘Kaplani
thought that hisi pants were on fire’.
To my knowledge no detailed study of the crucial semantic facts has been conducted for Ewe.
However Kusumoto 1998 cites relevant data from another language with logophoric pronouns,
Bafut.  Here is the example she provides in order to show that a De Re (non-De Se) reading can not
be rendered with a logophoric pronoun (her example (15)):
(40) Situation (Kaplan 1977): John is looking at a mirror from a distance and sees a man in the
mirror.  He notices that the man’s pants are on fire.  In fact, the man he sees in the mirror is
John himself, but he doesn’t realize it.
a. John believes that his pants are on fire
b. John wà?àt∂ m∂ *yu/à ká khi (Bafut; P.Tamanji,p.c to Kusumoto)
 John thinks that  self/he FUT burn
‘John thinks that he is going to get burnt’
4.1.4 Morgan 1970 and Chierchia 1987: PRO
Decisive examples of unambiguously De Se attitude reports were provided for English by
Morgan 1970 and by Chierchia 198727. The crucial observation is that PRO, the unpronounced
subject of an infinitive in a ‘control structure’, can only be used to report a De Se thought. Here is a
slightly different version of these examples:
(41) Situation: John is so drunk that he has forgotten that he is a candidate in the election.  He
watches someone on TV and finds that that person is a terrific candidate, who should
definitely be elected.  Unbeknownst to John, the candidate he is watching on TV is John
himself.
a. True: John hopes that he will be elected
b. False/#: John hopes PRO to be elected [Ok if the thought was: ‘I should be elected’]
As it appears, then, PRO in an attitude report can only be interpreted ‘De Se’: roughly, it can be used
only in case ‘I’ was used in the original discourse. In fact the generalization is slightly less
restrictive, since as is shown by the following example PRO can also be used in case the original
discourse was in the 2nd person (cf. similar examples in Chierchia 1987):
(42) Situation: At a party, John is told that ‘Mary’ is being particularly obnoxious. He tells the
person he is having a conversation with that ‘Mary should leave’.  But that person is none
other than Mary herself.
a. True: John told Mary that she should leave
                                                                                                                                                                     
(v) ‘he*’ is used to attribute, so to speak, implicit indexical reference to [the agent of the report]; that is, if [the agent of
the report] were to assert what, according to [the report], he knows, he would use the indicator ‘I’ where we, uttering [the
report], have used ‘he*’”  [Castañeda 1968 pp. 440-441]
27
 Only Chierchia made a connection between his examples and ‘attitudes De Se’; the term ‘attitudes De Se’ did not exist
in Morgan’s time, although Castañeda’s work was of course available.
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b. False/#: John told Mary to leave [Ok if the discourse was: ‘Leave!’]
Thus PRO can appear in the report only in case a 1st or a 2nd person pronoun was used (or could have
been used28) in the original discourse.
4.2 Morphological confirmation: some indexicals can be shifted
4.2.1 The Possibility of an Intermediate Theory: Chierchia 1987 [after Lewis 1979]
While the facts presented above show unambiguously that Kaplan’s theory of Indirect
Discourse is empirically inadequate, they do not prove that a system with quantification over
contexts is actually needed.  In fact the most influential analysis of De Se reports, put forth by
Chierchia 1987,  does without context-shifting. The conceptual point is that it is perfectly possible to
quantify simultaneously over each coordinate of a context instead of quantifying directly over the
context itself. This is the solution represented in a. below. By contrast, the solution advocated here is
represented in b. [for uniformity I use a notation in which the embedded context is bound by a
lambda-operator]:
(43) a. John hopes λx λt λw [∃t’: t’>t] x is elected president at t’ in w
b. John hopes λc  [∃t’: t’>time(c)] x is elected president at t’ in world(c)
There is a simple correspondence between the two theories: contexts can be identified to triples of
the form <x, t, w>, where x is the author, t is the time and w is the world of c; there is a simple
correspondence between ‘λx λt λw ϕ’ and ‘λ<x, t, w>ϕ’29; hence there is a simple correspondence
between a. and b. Since Chierchia was interested in De Se with respect to individuals, he simply left
out the abstraction over times in (43)a. Similarly, Abusch 1997, who was only interested in the
interpretation of tense, could leave out the individual coordinate. But when one puts these theories
together the result is as in (43)a, which corresponds directly to the solution in b.
Given the facts that were known at the time, the solution in a. was not unreasonable. Its effect
was to allow attitude reports to distinguish between thoughts with the same content (contrary to
Kaplan’s own theory of indirect discourse), without granting that Kaplanian monsters were possible,
since no context parameter or variable was manipulated.30
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 This proviso is important to capture the following example, which was pointed out to me by J. Almog. Suppose that de
Gaulle said (without being in any way drunk): 'De Gaulle should be elected.' One could still say truly that de Gaulle
hoped to be elected. For even though de Gaulle sometimes chose to speak of himself in the 3rd person, he still didn't doubt
in such situations that the speaker was de Gaulle himself. As the formal system below will make clear, what matters in
the end is not which words the agent used, but rather which contexts were compatible with his attitude. In this sense the
de Gaulle case is crucially different from the example in (41).
29
 The latter is the ‘schönfinkelized’ version of the former.
30
 It should be noted that Chierchia’s analysis added several idiosyncrasies to a Lewisian account of attitude reports.
(i) First, Chierchia claimed that embedded clauses could either be treated as propositions or as properties. Thus a
proposition-based  system was preserved for De Re (non-De Se) readings, while a property-based account was used for
De Se reports. This is thus a mixed theory, which Lewis 1979 wouldn’t have endorsed. Lewis’s point was precisely that
one could and should do everything in terms of properties, since the latter are strictly more fine-grained than
propositions. Why, then, have a mixed account?
(ii) Second, Chierchia claimed, in effect, that attitude reports are not special. He argued that De Se readings are simply a
by-product of the syntactic appearance of property-denoting clauses, such as infinitives. He had no way to single out a
natural class of ‘attitude reports’, something which was a virtue given the data he had access to. But as soon as one
considers logophoric pronouns (and shifted indexicals), this becomes a liability, for these are items that can only occur in
attitude reports.
These idiosyncracies are not shared by Heim 1991b, who in addition develops a system in which indexicals, like De Se
pronouns, are bound by an operator in Comp. The crucial move is to posit that not just embedded clauses, but also matrix
clauses can contain a λ-operator in their complementizer position. (Heim notes that there is a ‘premonition’ of this
proposal in Koopman & Sportiche 1989). See also Kratzer 1997 and Heim 2002.
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4.2.2 Why an intermediate theory is undesirable: shifted indexicals
This intermediate theory is undesirable, however. As it turns out, there are a number of
indexicals cross-linguistically which can be shifted in attitude reports31. Adopting a solution based on
quantification over contexts derives this fact straightforwardly. By contrast, the intermediate theory
would have to make special stipulations for these cases.  In what follows I go through a list of
examples that show that  some indexicals can be shifted in attitude reports.
(i) Consider the expressions ‘two days ago’ / ‘in two days’ in English and their French
counterparts ‘il y a deux jours' / 'dans deux jours' (for ‘in two days’, I have in mind the reading: ‘at
the end of a period of two days’, not ‘within a period of two days’. The ambiguity leads to additional
complexities; the French expression is unambiguous in the desired way, which is why I use it). First,
it is clear from their meanings that these expressions are context-dependent, since ‘two days ago’ and
’in two days’ uttered on Monday do not refer to the same day as the same expressions uttered on
Tuesday. In this respect they are analogous to the expressions ‘the day before yesterday’ and ’the day
after tomorrow’, which appear to have exactly the same meanings. But there is one difference, which
I illustrate using ‘two days ago’. While ‘the day before yesterday’ is a well-behaved Kaplanian
indexical, which can only be evaluated with respect to the context of the actual speech act, such is
not the case of ‘two days ago’:
(44) John has told me repeatedly over the years: ‘I  was still sick two days ago/the day before
yesterday’
a. #John has told me repeatedly over the years that he was still sick the day before yesterday.
b. John has told me repeatedly over the years that he was still sick two days ago
In b. it is apparent that ‘two days ago’ can be evaluated with respect to the context of the reported
speech act. But this is impossible in a. Note that 'two days ago' can also be interpreted with respect to
the actual speech act, which is why it is crucial that attitude verbs be treated as quantifiers over
contexts rather than as context-shifting modal operators. (If we had made the latter choice the
original context of utterance would systematically become unavailable in the scope of an attitude
verb, which predicts that an indexical should be forced to be shifted in such environments.)
One could suspect that ‘two days ago’ is not a strict indexical, and that its ability to be shifted
simply shows that it is context-dependent by accident, so to speak. It could be pointed out that there
are expressions such as ‘before’ (and 'earlier' or 'later'), which can be used indexically and can also
be shifted, although it is unlikely that they are strict indexicals (that is, elements that are lexically
specified as indexicals):
(45) John has told me repeatedly over the years: ‘I  have been sick before’
=> John has told me repeatedly over the years that had been sick before
 Clearly ‘before’ uttered on Monday does not have the same semantic contribution as ‘before’ uttered
on Tuesday. Furthermore, the preceding example shows that it can have a shifted reading when it
appears under an attitude verb. Still, there is every reason to think that ‘before’ is indexical ‘by
accident’. Its other uses (‘before Monday’, etc.) suggest that it has an unpronounced temporal
                                                 
31
 These cases should not be confused with ‘Free Indirect Discourse’, a literary style of considerable interest discussed,
among others, by Banfield 1982, Reinhart 1983 and Doron 1991. In Free Indirect Discourse as well, indexicals can be
evaluated with respect to a non-actual speech act, as in the following example:
(i) a. Tomorrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week!  [Lawrence,  Women in Love,  p.
185, London, Heinemann 1971;  cited in Banfield 1982 p. 98 (her (54)]
b. #He thought: ‘Tomorrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week!’
c. #He thought that tomorrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week!
One major difference between the cases discussed in this paper and Free Indirect Discourse is that the latter cannot
normally appear as part of a ‘that’-clause, as shown in c. Furthermore, the indexicals that can be shifted in Free Indirect
Discourse and in regular Indirect Discourse are not the same. ‘Tomorrow’ and ‘yesterday’ can be shifted in Free Indirect
Discourse, but not in regular Indirect Discourse. The relation between shiftability in attitude reports and Free Indirect
Discourse is discussed in Sharvit 2001.
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argument: ‘before t’. Presumably 't', a null temporal pronominal, may refer to any element made
salient in the discourse32. Among these is the time of utterance, hence the appearance of indexicality.
If this analysis is on the right track, we should expect that the temporal argument of ‘before t’ can in
fact refer to any salient moment, whether the expression is embedded under an attitude operator or
not. This is indeed what we find, as is demonstrated by the following cases of discourse anaphora:
(46) a. A week ago I met a man who was still sick two days before.
b. A week ago I met John. He was still sick two days before.
Thus  ‘two days before’ cannot be taken to falsify Kaplan’s theory of demonstratives, since it does
not appear that the expression qualifies as a strict indexical to start with. But ‘two days ago’ is
different in that it cannot so easily depend on any salient moment. Rather, ‘two days ago’ is easily
evaluated  only with respect to the context of some reported speech act. This explains why c. below
is degraded (we will return to the fact that it is not entirely unacceptable):
(47) a. I met John last week. Two days before he was still sick.
b. *I met John last week. The day before yesterday he was still sick.
c. ?I met John last week. Two days ago he was still sick.
The facts might be even clearer with French ‘dans deux jours’ (‘in two days’), as contrasted with
‘après-demain’ (‘the day after tomorrow’)33:
(48) a. J’ai rencontré Jean la semaine dernière. Deux jours plus tard il était malade.
    I have met Jean the week last. Two days later he is dead.
‘I met Jean a week ago. Two days later he was sick.’
b. *J’ai rencontré Jean il y a une semaine. Après-demain il était malade.
    I have met Jean there is a week. The-day-after-tomorrow he was sick.
c. *J’ai rencontré Jean il y a une semaine. Dans deux jours il était malade.
      I have met Jean there is a week.  In two days he was sick.
As one would expect from its indexical nature, ‘two days ago’ (and ‘dans deux jours’) can only be
read ‘De Se’ with respect to time. In other words, the time with respect to which ‘two days ago’ is
evaluated when it is shifted can only be the ‘now’ of the agent (to use Abusch’s terminology). Here
again it contrasts minimally with ‘two days earlier/before’, which has the ability to be evaluated with
respect to any salient antecedent. The crucial test is provided by the following example, in which the
De Se and the De Re readings are truth-conditionally distinguished:
(49) Situation: 3 days ago (on Wednesday), John told me: ‘According to the newspaper, it rained in
L.A. on Monday’. John erroneously thought that he was speaking on Thursday (i.e. 3 days
after Monday). He was in fact talking on Wednesday.
a. John said that it had rained two days earlier/before
b. #John said that it had rained two days ago
Why should (49)b not be true/acceptable? Simply because John’s thought was of the form ‘It rained
on Monday’, and certainly not of the form ‘It rained two days ago/the day before yesterday’, with a
temporal indexical. For if John had been asked to state his belief in indexical terms he would have
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 Exactly the same facts –and the same analysis- hold of the expressions ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ (here the comparative
suggests that there is a concealed temporal argument, e.g. ‘earlier than t’).
33
 These data can be replicated with English ‘in two days’, but one must be careful to block the unwanted reading of
‘within two days’. This can be done by using ‘in at least two days’, which is uninformative and hence infelicitous on the
reading: ‘within a period of at least two days’ (the reading ‘at the end of a period of at least two days’ is, by contrast,
informative).   Here are the relevant examples:
(i) a. I met John a week ago. At least two days later he was sick.
b. *I met John a week ago. The day after tomorrow he was sick.
c. <*>I met John a week ago. In at least two days he was sick.
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said: ‘It rained three days ago’ (since he believed that the conversation was taking place on
Thursday).
All these facts are entirely unexpected for a theory that prohibits indexicals from being shifted.
By contrast, they follow straightforwardly on the monster-based theory advocated here. ‘Two days
ago’ is specified as taking a context variable as argument; in other words, the expression is well-
formed only in case it appears in a logical form as ‘two-days-ago(c)’.  Since attitude verbs are
analyzed as quantifiers over contexts, the only two representations of the preceding sentences are as
follows:
(50) John said that it had rained two days ago
a. Past tk SAY<John,tk,actually>ci rain(two-days-ago(ci), world(ci))
b. Past tk SAY<John,tk,actually>ci rain(two-days-ago(c*), world(ci))
c. [[(a)]]c,s =1 iff for some t∈T before cT, for all c’ compatible with John’s claim at  t. in cW,
[[rain(two-days-ago(ci), world(ci))]]c, s[ci−>c’]=1
Here c* is a free variable whose value is contextually supplied, and which by convention must
denote the context of the actual speech act c (this convention must be integrated to the ‘Compatibility
condition’ between the initial assignment of evaluation s and the context of utterance c which was
discussed in Section 3.2.3: it must always be the case that s(c*)=c). The crucial point is that in a., in
which ‘two days ago’ is shifted, the expression must take the embedded context as argument, which
automatically yields a ‘De Se’, shifted reading, as in c. As for the unshifted reading, it is
straightforwardly derived by b.
Do other cases of shifting occur? Not if the only way to introduce a context variable (other
than c*) in a representation is by quantifying over it, i.e. by introducing an attitude operator.
However the marginal acceptability of (47)c suggests that it might be possible to leave a context
variable free if the discourse situation provides it with a salient value. There appear to be special
constraints on this mechanism, as is shown by the fact that (48)c can be made to have roughly the
status of (47)c, but only if the tense of the second sentence is modified:
(51) ?J’ai rencontré Jean il y a une semaine. Dans deux jours (*après-demain) il serait malade.
  I have met Jean there is a week. In two days (*the-day-after-tomorrow) he would-be sick.
‘I met Jean a week ago. In two days he would be sick’
I conclude that under ill-understood conditions a context variable other than c* may be left free in a
Logical Form, which leads to some marginal cases of shifting of ‘two days ago’/‘in two days’
outside of attitude reports34.
Let us observe, finally, that the present theory predicts that in cases of iterated attitude reports
a shiftable indexical could depend on any attitude verb in whose scope it appears. This is because
attitude verbs are analyzed here as quantifiers over contexts rather than as modal operators. The
following sentence suggests that the desired ambiguity is real:
(52) My brother has informed me repeatedly over the years that my mother had asked the night
before where I had been two days ago.
Assuming that ‘the night before’ is evaluated with respect to my brother’s speech act, there appear to
be two readings for ‘two days ago’: it may be evaluated with respect to the time either of my
mother’s or of my brother’s speech act, as is predicted35.
(ii) The same analysis can be given for indexicals in languages other than English. Each time
the argument should in principle have three steps: (a) show that, semantically, the element is context-
dependent; (b) prove that the element is lexically specified as being context-dependent, i.e. that it
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 Thanks to François Recanati and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions on this topic.
35
 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that this prediction be tested.
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behaves like ‘two days ago’ rather than like ‘earlier’; and finally, (c) show that the element in
question can only be interpreted ‘De Se’ when it is shifted. I only provide arguments (a) and (b)
because the judgments in (c) were not clear-cut for my informant.
In the following example the 1st person embedded pronoun is clearly evaluated with respect to
the context of the reported rather than of the actual act36:
(53) Situation: John says: ‘I am a hero’ [D. Petros, p.c.]
jon j na  n-nn  yl -all
John hero be.PF-1SO 3M.say-AUX.3M
“John says that he is a hero”
Typically one reacts to such examples by claiming that the embedded clause must be quoted.  But in
at least some examples this can be shown not to be the case.  Consider the following sentence, which
involves a shifted 2nd person pronoun:
(54) mn  amt’ -a  nd-al- -nn    al-smma-hu-mm  (Leslau 1995 p. 779)
what  bring.IMPER-2M   COMP-say.PF-3M-1SO  NEG-hear.PF-1S-NEG
'I didn’t hear what he told me to bring' (lit. I didn't hear that he said to me bring what)
If the embedded clause had been quoted, the original discourse should have been of the form: ‘bring
what!’. But as the translation shows, this is not the correct reading (in fact, such a direct discourse
would presumably be meaningless). Rather, the report means that he told me ‘Bring X!’, and I didn’t
hear what X was. The fact that there is an indirect question shows that the embedded clause is not
quoted. Despite this, the embedded 2nd person pronoun can be evaluated with respect to the context
of the reported speech act37. One could explain away these examples by claiming that only part of the
embedded clause is quoted - in our case, only the embedded 2nd person morpheme. But crucially this
is not a possibility that is normally open in cases of quotation. Thus in English ‘I’ or 'you' cannot
normally be quoted in indirect discourse - otherwise ‘Mary didn't hear what John told her 'you'
should bring’  should mean ‘Mary didn't hear what John told her she (=Mary) should bring’, contrary
to fact.
With this background in mind, we can ensure that it is only in attitude reports that Amharic 1st
and 2nd person pronouns can be shifted. That this is the case is suggested by the following contrasts,
where Amharic behaves exactly like English, for the simple reason that no attitude verb is involved,
and thus no context-shifting is possible (Degif Petros, p.c.):
(55) a. [Myk brother]i found a girl that hei, *k likes
b. [Myk brother]i found a girl that I*i, k like
a'. wndm - e     ymm -i -wd  -at -n    ljj  ann
 brother-POSS.1S  REL-3M-love.IMP-3FO-ACC  girl  find.PF.3M
'My brother found a girl he  likes/loves'38
b'. wndm - e     ymm - -wd  -at -n    ljj  ann
 brother-POSS.1S  REL-1-love.IMP-3FO-ACC  girl  find.PF.3M
'My brother found a girl I like/love'
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 Thanks to Degif Petros, Mengistu Amberber, Delombera Negga and Makonnen Argaw for help with the data and the
transcriptions.
37
 As the gloss indicates, the embedded verb is in the imperative. This is surprising since in other languages (e.g. English)
the imperative indicates that an order is given by the speaker of the actual speech act rather than by the speaker of a
reported speech act. It might be that the typological differences we observed with indexicals also exist with imperatives
(as suggested by U. Larsen, p.c.).
38
 As pointed out by M. Amberber and M. Argaw, the word ljj   (pronounced lj  by M. Argaw) can in other contexts
mean “child” or “boy”. "set ljj” (lit. female child) could be used to disambiguate.
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It should be noted that similar facts have been noted for Engenni in Thomas 1978; for Aghem in
Hyman 1979; and for Navajo in Hale & Platero 1998 and Speas 199939.
 
Exactly the same form of argument can be applied to the case of the Russian present tense. In
(56)a the tense of the embedded clause can be evaluated with respect to the context of the reported
speech act; but the use of a 3rd person pronoun to refer to the author of the reported speech act
(=Petja) shows that the embedded clause is not quoted (Petja would have used 'I' to refer to himself):
(56) a. petjai skazal,c#to oni plac#et [Russian]
     Petjai  said   that hei is-crying
‘Petja said that he was crying [at the time of his utterance]’
b. petjai vstretil c#eloveka, otoryj  plac#et [Russian]
     Petja met      person,      who    is-crying
‘Petja met a person who is crying / cries’
NOT: ‘Petja met a person who was crying [at the time of the meeting]’
[Similar examples in Kondrashov & Kondrashova 1999. See also Kusumoto 1998]
Crucially, shifting is possible only in attitude reports. As shown in b., shifting is impossible in a
relative clause. Furthermore, it can be shown that the generalization is semantic rather than syntactic
in nature. Other complement clauses behave differently from the complement of ‘say’ in case they
appear under verbs that are not attitude operators:
(57) a. c#asto sluc#alos’, c#tomis#a plakal / *plac#et  (Janssen 1996)
often happened, that Misha cried  / is-crying
b. It often happened that Misha cried / *is crying
In other words, Russian behaves just like English when a clause is embedded under the verb ‘happen’.
From the present perspective, this is entirely predicted on the assumption that the Russian present tense
is a shiftable indexical. Being an indexical, it must take as argument a context variable. But ‘happen’,
which is not an attitude verb, fails to introduce a context variable, and therefore the Russian present
tense cannot be shifted when it appears under such a verb.40
                                                 
39
  Thomas 1978 uses the term 'semi-indirect discourse' to refer to such examples, which are difficult to classify as
involving either  'direct' or 'indirect' discourse, at least on a traditional analysis of indexicals. As she observes, in (ia) the
embedded 2nd person pronoun suggests that direct discourse is used, while the embedded 3rd person pronoun argues for
indirect discourse. The same point is made by Hyman 1979 concerning (ib) (the 2nd person pronoun is evaluated with
respect to the context of the reported speech act, but the presence of the 3rd person logophoric pronoun indicates that the
embedded clause is not quoted).
(i) a. ò wei ga ...  bhú tou eì ka òkì nàà  ìwó wu   zà
2-sub 3(-ref)-obj 3-ref-sub 2-obj
    he say [sp you  should-take him seq he  and  you should-die  stay]
‘He said, “Look after me, and I will die with you”’  or
‘He said that she should look after him, and he would die with her’  [Engenni, Kwa; Thomas 1978]
b. wìzÍn ‘vÚ ndzÈ à wÍn NÍ’á  é Ngé ‘lÍghá wò
 [woman that] said to him [that LOG-3 much  like you]
 ‘the woman said to him that she liked him a lot’, or
 ‘the woman said to him “I like you”’ [Aghem, Bantu; Hyman 1979]
Note also that in Amharic shifting seems to occur only after an all-purpose attitude verb which originally means ‘say’.
Why this is so is unclear to me, and should definitely be investigated.
40
 Abusch 1997 gave interesting examples that suggest (in our terms) that the Russian facts can be replicated within a
fragment of English (Abusch did not mention Russian, however). As Abusch observed, the point of evaluation of modals
such as ‘might’ and ‘ought’ can be shifted, but only in ‘intensional’ environments. This is a slightly different
generalization from the one we are suggesting here, since for Abusch intensional operators also include ‘will’, which is
taken to shift the time coordinate (the ‘now parameter’) with respect to which tense is evaluated. Here are Abusch’s
original examples:
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5 A Monster-Based Account
In ‘Where Monsters Dwell’, Israel & Perry observed that Kaplan’s prohibition against monsters
was nothing more than a stipulation, and that one would expect to find monsters in the domain of
attitude reports.  While they did not know examples of monstrous (shifted) indexicals, their
conjecture was exactly correct, and essentially for the right reasons41.  I follow their lead, and give
two versions of a theory that makes crucial use of quantification over contexts. The first version,
which is developed in greater detail in Schlenker 1999,  relies on heavily indexed logical forms. The
second version seeks to eliminate some of the syntactic stipulations of the first theory, and to provide
a semantic account which is more elegant and makes different, and hopefully better, predictions.
5.1 Three Components
In both versions, the analysis has three components.
5.1.1 Quantification Over Contexts
Since we justified earlier the use of context variables, we can directly define the syntax and
semantics of (simplified) attitude verbs, construed as quantifiers over contexts. For simplicity, we
concentrate on the verb ‘say’.  As can be seen, the analysis is entirely similar to the quantificational
version of a modal analysis, except that quantification over possible worlds is replaced with
quantification over contexts42:
(58) a. Syntax
If φ is a well-formed formula, if ci is a context variable, and if α’, β’, γ’ are respectively an
individual, a time and a world term, then  SAY<α’, β’, γ’> ciφ is a well-formed formula.
                                                                                                                                                                     
 (i) a. John married a woman who might become rich (Abusch’s (40))
ok John’s bride could become rich at the time of utterance
* John’s bride could become rich at the time of John’s wedding
b. John believed that his bride might become rich (Abusch’s (41))
ok John believed that, at the time of this thought, his bride could become rich
(Note that the contrast between (ia) and (ib) involves not just a shift in temporal perspective, but also in epistemic
perspective: in (ia) ‘might’ is evaluated with respect to the speaker’s Common Ground, while in (ib) it is evaluated with
respect to John’s epistemic alternatives).
Future research should determine which version of the generalization is correct. Different predictions are made for the
following examples:
(ii) a. John married a woman who wanted to have children who might become rich.
b. (#)John married a woman who would later have children who might become rich.
On both theories (iia) is predicted to be grammatical. (iib) is predicted by Abusch to be fine on the reading: ‘... who
would later, at t’,  have children who, at t’, might  become rich’. I predict that this reading should be unavailable.
Preliminary data suggest that this is indeed the case. (Heim 1994b (fn. 22) claims that Abusch’s prediction is borne out.
However her example involves embedding, not under ‘would’, but under ‘will’, which in any event allows tenses –e.g.
the present- to be ‘shifted’. An account of this fact that does not hinge on Abusch’s assumption concerning the ‘now’
parameter is offered in Schlenker 1999).
41
 “But  now  we should remind ourselves of the following facts about actual utterances and the contexts in which they
are produced: one might not know who the agent of c is; one might not know when the time of c is; one might not know
what the place of c is; one might not know what the world of c is. (...) So given a type for an utterance, that is, given a
sentence Φ, other contexts for  Φ are epistemic alternatives.  (...)  In conformity with Kaplan’s restriction, and supposing
for simplicity that indices proper -circumstances- are just worlds, all he would allow us is this:
c, w |= KΦ iff ∀w’: w’ RK w ⇒ c, w’  |= Φ
But to capture the facts about ignorance, what we need is rather more like this:
c, w |= KΦ iff ∀c’, w’: <c, w> RK <c’, w’> ⇒ c’, w’  |= Φ; where c’=<c’a, c’t, c’p, c’w>.
This, of course, is monstrous.” (Perry & Israel 1996, pp. 314-315)
42
 Special provisions must be made for quantifying in, but these are no different in this theory from what they are
elsewhere.
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b. Semantics 
[[SAY<α’, β’, γ’>  ci φ]] c, s=1 iff for all c’ compatible with the claim made by [[α’]]c, s at time
[[β’]]c,s in world [[γ’]]c, s: [[φ]] c, s[ci −>c’] =1
(Although for ‘say’ the contexts compatible with the agent’s claim are context of speech, for verbs
such as ‘hope’ the relevant entities are contexts of thought43.)
There is an analytical choice to be made at this point. We may either take contexts as
primitive, or construct them out of entities such as ‘speaker’, ‘time of utterance’, ‘world of
utterance’. Minimally one needs an individual, a time and a world to define a context.  Two
individuals are sometimes more convenient, to represent both the speaker and the hearer of the
speech act. This choice can be important when morpho-syntactic rules must be defined which
narrowly depend on the way in which context variables are represented. If contexts are primitive,
context variables such as ‘c’ can be used directly. Otherwise contexts will have to be represented as
tuples of the form <x, (y), t, w>, and attitude verbs will in effect quantify simultaneously over all
three or four coordinates.
5.1.2 Filtering Mechanism: Shiftable vs. Non-Shiftable Indexicals. Logophoricity.
Once this semantics is in place, we will have to address Kaplan’s original motivation for
prohibiting quantification over contexts. The problem is that although some indexicals can be
shifted, as our theory predicts, others cannot be. These expressions are well-behaved from a
Kaplanian standpoint, but they are unexpected on the present theory since in principle every
indexical should have the ability to be shifted under an attitude verb. Some lexical stipulations are
needed to insure that English ‘I’ or ‘yesterday’, unlike Amharic ‘I’, or ‘two days ago’, should never
be shifted.  Under the 1st theory to be presented below, the filtering is done in the morpho-syntax; a
distinction is enforced between ‘matrix’ and ‘embedded’ context variables, and certain sequences of
symbols (e.g. ‘tomorrow(c)’, where ‘c’ is an embedded context variable) are stipulated to be ill-
formed. In the 2nd theory to be discussed, the filtering is effected in the semantics: some lexical
specification prevents ‘I’ from having the actual speaker as its semantic value44. As we will see, the
predictions are slightly different, in a rather interesting way.
On either theory, two natural classes are defined: roughly, that of elements that can only be
evaluated with respect to the actual speech act (English ‘I’), and the class of elements that can be
evaluated with respect to any context whatsoever (Amharic ‘I’).  A natural morphological
implementation of this distinction is to posit a binary feature ±actual speech act. Both English ‘I’ and
Amharic ‘I’ are indexical expressions (they have, if you will, a feature ‘+contextual’). But in
addition, English ‘I’ is specified as ‘+actual speech act’, while Amharic ‘I’ is simply underspecified
for ±actual speech act. This makes a typological prediction: there should be elements that are
+contextual and -actual speech act. How would such expressions behave? Since they are +contextual
expressions, they must either depend on the actual speech act, or else be embedded under an attitude
verb. But since they are -actual speech act expressions, the first option is precluded. Thus they
should be elements that may only appear in the scope of an attitude operator, and must thus be
semantically dependent on the context variable introduced by such operators. These expressions
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 It may in the end be necessary  to countenance improper contexts as well, for instance (a) contexts whose author does
not exist at the time and world of the context, or (b) contexts without an author coordinate. This would seem to be
important to handle (i) below, which was suggested by Irene Heim and Jay Rifkin (p.c.):
(i) I would prefer PRO not to exist
 Because the embedded verb involves PRO, the sentence should be interpreted De Se, and thus involve (in our terms)
quantification over contexts. The desired reading should presumably be something like: ‘in every (possibly improper)
context c compatible with what I would prefer, the author of c does not exist in the world of c at the time of c (or: c has
no author coordinate)’. See Predelli 1998 for a defense of improper contexts.
44
 The necessary feature might be similar to Recanati 1993’s ‘REF’ [“A term is (type)-referential if and only if its
linguistic meaning includes a feature, call it ‘REF’, by virtue of which it indicates that the truth-condition  (or, more
generally, satisfaction-condition) of the utterance where it occurs is singular” (p. 17)].
29
exist: they are the logophoric pronouns whose behavior was described earlier; they are also the
natural-language counterparts of Castañeda’s ‘he*’.  But instead of being stipulated, their very
existence is now predicted by the filtering mechanism which is needed independently to capture the
distinction between English and Amharic ‘I’.
It should be noted that logophoric forms are not limited to the person domain. There is in
German a tense/mood called ‘Konjunktiv I’ (1st subjunctive45), which (i) can (almost) solely occur
under attitude verbs, and which furthermore (ii) must be interpreted as dependent on an attitude verb,
as shown by the following facts:
(59) Der Peter meint, a.  es sei später, als es tatsächlich ist
the Peter  thinks it be later   than it   really is
b.  es ist später, als es tatsächlich ist
it is later   than it   really is
      c.  * es sei später, als es tatsächlich sei
 it be later   than it   really be
 d. * es is später, als es tatsächlich sei 
  it be later   than it   really be
Although the German indicative (glossed as ‘is’) may be interpreted either inside or outside the
scope of an attitude verb, the 2nd possibility is precluded for the ‘Konjunktiv I’ (glossed as ‘be’). This
directly accounts for the ungrammaticality of c. and d. The natural suggestion is that the German
Konjunktiv I is nothing but a temporal or modal version of the logophoric pronouns that are found in
Ewe: it is an indexical expression which can only depend on the context of a reported speech act.
Another way to make the same point is to observe that, in those cases where the Konjunktiv I
is not syntactically embedded, it forces a reading of modal subordination, as in the following
examples:
(60) a. Er sagte, sie sei schön.  Sie habe grüne Augen. [Jäger 1971]  He said  she
be pretty. She have green eyes.
b. Er sagte, sie sei schön.  Sie hat grüne Augen. [Jäger 1971]
He said, she be pretty. She has green eyes
As Jäger 1971 observes, in a., which involves a Konjunktiv I form of ‘have’, the 2nd sentence must be
read from the standpoint of the attitude holder, so that it is interpreted as: ‘He says/thinks that she has
green eyes’. No such reading is forced in b. This effect is rather strikingly similar to one found in
Ewe under similar circumstances:
(61) “The antecedent of the logophoric pronoun in Ewe need not occur in the same sentence, but
may occur several sentences earlier.  In such cases (...) the subsequent sentences of the
discourse will continue to present the events described by the narrator from the point of view
of the same individual or individuals. “ [Clements 1975 p. 170]
The final typology, then, will be the following (‘+C’ is short for ‘+contextual’):
(62) 
Amharic ‘I’ Russian Present +C ±actual
English ‘I’ English Present +C +actual
Logophoric pronouns Logophoric tense/mood +C -actual
It is a non-trivial result to derive the existence of logophoric pronouns from the feature mechanism
needed to get the difference between English ‘I’ and Amharic ‘I’. Still, there is a major stipulation
                                                 
45
 The name ‘subjunctive’ is partly misleading because the Konjunktiv I displays very different properties from the
Romance subjunctive. For instance, (i) the Romance subjunctive is not restricted to attitude reports; (ii) it cannot appear
embedded under ‘say’, unlike the Konjunktiv I.
30
left in this analysis, since the feature ±actual does not appear to be related to anything else in the
grammar. The 2nd theory to be presented below will seek to eliminate this stipulation, in the sense
that it will reduce the feature ±actual to another feature for which there is independent motivation.
5.1.3 Agreement Mechanism
A final element of the analysis must be introduced. In a nutshell, every analysis that allows an
embedded pronoun (or tense) to be dependent on a context variable must explain why the same
pronoun can still inherit the syntactic features that appear on the matrix subject.  The problem
appears clearly in the following examples:
(63) a. John hopes PRO to buy himself a car.
b. Mary hopes PRO to buy herself a car.
c. You hope PRO to buy yourself a car.
d. I hope PRO to buy myself a car.
In each case the reflexive pronoun, and therefore its local binder PRO, bears the features of the
matrix subject. But in this kind of logical forms, there is no relation between PRO and the matrix
subject (the following is a simpler example, from Appendix II B.):
(64) HOPE<John,now,actually>ci be-elected(agent(ci), time(ci), world(ci))
This problem is not new, and it has appeared under different forms in other researchers’ work, e.g.
Chierchia and Heim (the latter stated an explicit agreement rule to account for the percolation of
features in similar examples in Heim 1994a).  In this case as well, two theories will be presented
below. The first theory will claim that the agreement must essentially be stipulated, in that in such
cases the relevant features simply fail to be interpreted. The stipulation is not entirely idle, since it is
supposed to account for cases of semantically empty agreement in the person but also in the tense
domain (‘Sequence of Person’, ‘Sequence of Tense’). The second theory, by contrast, will seek to do
without this stipulation altogether, which will involve a slight revision of the semantic analysis.
5.2 Rich LFs (Schlenker 1999)
I review briefly the theory presented in Schlenker 1999, simplifying somewhat the notation
(this is possible in part because I ignore the issue of Free Indirect Discourse, which Schlenker 1999
tried to analyze within the same analytical framework as shifted indexicals; since the two phenomena
display very different properties, this made for a rather baroque system).
In this system it is crucial that a distinguished context variable, c*,  be set aside to refer to the
actual context. The formation rules are as before, as is the semantics for attitude verbs. Two points
are special about this theory: the analysis of the filtering mechanism, and the account of agreement.
5.2.1 Filtering Mechanism
The necessary stipulation is that some indexicals can only take c* as argument, while others
may take any context variable, and still others can only take non-c* variables as arguments. In other
words, the feature ±actual speech act is reanalyzed as ±c*. The lexical entries in English, Amharic
and Ewe are as follows:
(65) a. English ‘I’: +indexical, +c*
b. Amharic ‘I’: +indexical  [underspecified]
c. Ewe logophoric pronoun: +indexical, -c*
Thus it is in the logical syntax that certain representations are blocked that would make English ‘I’ a
shifted indexicals:
(66) Say<x1,  x2, t1, w1> c hero(I(c), time(c), world(c))
This sentence would be perfectly interpretable, but the lexical entry of ‘I’ does not allow it to take a
‘c’ argument. All it can take is a ‘c*’ argument, and since by hypothesis the value of the latter is
31
always the actual speech act, the effect is that English ‘I’ is a Kaplanian indexical, one that can never
be shifted. By contrast, an equivalent sentence in Amharic is well-formed, because Amharic ‘I’ does
not have such a restriction:
(67) a. SAY<x1,  x2, t1, w1> c hero(ΙAmh(c), time(c), world(c))
b. [[SAY<x1,  x2, t1, w1> c ΙAmh(c) be a hero at time(c) in world(c)]]s, C*=1
if and only if for every context C compatible with what s(x1) tells s(x2) at s(t1) in s(w1), the
author of C is a hearo at the time of C in the world of C.
5.2.2 Agreement Mechanism
With English and Amharic 1st person pronouns taken care of, it must still be explained how
PRO may inherit features from the matrix subject even though it is bound by the embedded context
variable.
Consider the following example in a., with the simplified LF in b. (note that standard locality
conditions on the reflexive 'himself' force it to be bound by PRO):
(68) a. John hopes PROk to buy himselfk/*herselfk a car
b. HOPE<x1,  t1, w1> ci buy-for(agent(ci), agent(ci), time(ci) in world(ci))
The first thing to observe is that the features on PRO do not appear to be interpreted. Let us
again analyze gender features in presuppositional terms. The contribution of a masculine feature is
thus that the value of the variable under any assignment may only be a male individual:
(69)  [[hei]]s is defined only if s(i) is a male individual. If defined, [[hei]]s=s(i).
In a simple case, this appears to make correct predictions. Using the rule of presupposition projection
for universally quantified statements, we determine that every context c compatible with the agent's
hope must satisfy the presupposition of the nuclear scope 'buy-for(agent(ci), agent(ci), time(ci),
world(ci))', where c is the value of the variable ci.. If 'agent(ci)' is decorated with a masculine feature,
this will yield the result that all contexts compatible with the person's hope have a male agent.  In
simple cases this does not appear to be a problem; John is male, and all contexts compatible with his
hope are likely to be contexts whose author is male as well. But now consider the following variation
of the previous example:
(70) John (a transsexual) hopes to become a woman, and he hopes PRO to buy himself/*herself a
car
The discourse has been set up in such a way that all contexts compatible with John’s hope are now
contexts with a female author. The presuppositional analysis of gender features predicts that
‘himself’ should yield a presupposition failure in this case; by contrast,  ‘herself’ should be used
unproblematically. But exactly the opposite is the case.
Entirely parallel examples can be constructed in the tense domain (see also Heim 1994b for
discussion):
(71) In 1999 John believed that he was already in year 2005, and that Clinton was still president
By stipulation all contexts compatible with John’s thought are contexts whose time coordinate must
follow the time of the actual speech act. But the presuppositional analysis predicts that the preceding
sentence should then be incoherent:
(72) Bel<John, 1999, w*>c (time(c)=2005 ∧ president (Clinton, time(c), world(c))
Due to the past tense, the presupposition on time(c) is that its value should precede the time of
utterance, i.e. 2002. This should make the sentence a presupposition failure, contrary to fact. Thus
tense features do not appear to be interpreted when a variable is semantically dependent on an
embedded context.
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In the tense literature the solution would be to posit a Sequence of Tense rule, which allows
tense features to remain uninterpreted in certain environments. In fact quite independently of our
somewhat exotic example a Sequence of Tense rule is known to be necessary (even when none of the
agents is confused about the time):
(73) Abusch’s version of Kamp & Rohrer’s French examples
John decided a week ago that in ten days at breakfast he would say to his mother that they were
having their last meal together.
The tense of the most deeply embedded clause (‘were having’) refers to a moment which is after any
other time mentioned in the discourse. Thus any theory of tense that requires the past tense features
to be interpreted in this case is bound to go wrong. The quasi-consensus in the literature is that there
are Sequence of Tense rules, which leave certain tense features uninterpreted when they appear
under attitude verbs that bear themselves the same features.
It is no trivial matter to implement the agreement rule which is needed both in the case of
tense and in the case of person. The solution adopted in Schlenker 1999 was to decompose contexts
into tuples of variables of the form <x1, y2, t0, w0>, where by convention the superscripts 0, 1, 2
indicate that a variable is a coordinate of a context (note that a variable could have both a superscript
and a subscript. As was mentioned above, any number of context variables could be needed in a
given sentence; hence within this new notational framework any number of author, hearer, time or
world coordinates might appear in a representation). It was further stipulated that embedded contexts
inherit their features from the matrix clause: the author coordinate inherits the features of the
speaker/thinker argument, the hearer coordinate (if any) inherits the features of the hearer argument,
and similarly for the time and world arguments. The agreement was enforced as a part of the
construction rule for attitude operators:
(74) Syntax
Let x’, y’, t’ and w’ be any variables or constants, and let α, β, γ, δ be the features borne by
these elements [we abbreviate this as: x’(α), y’(β), t’(γ), w’(δ) ]
If φ is a well-formed formula, then so is ‘Say<x’(α),  y(β), t(γ), w(δ)> <x1(α), y2(β), t0(γ), w0(δ)> φ’
The details of this system are rather complex, and will not be considered further here. Suffice it
to say that that this system has to be further supplemented with rules that stipulate that features
inherited through agreement are not interpreted. The system is admittedly stipulative, but part of the
motivation was to show that exactly the same stipulations could account for Sequence of Person and
for Sequence of Tense.  (A further argument was given in Schlenker 1999 to show that in other cases
- involving ‘only’ – some features had to be disregarded anyway. However this argument was based
on a dubious generalization, which is discussed later in this paper).
While the system developed so far is roughly adequate, it is also stipulative. This is because both
the filtering device and the agreement mechanism are postulated in an entirely ad hoc fashion. There
are in fact two distinct problems:
-In the case of the filtering mechanism, the problem is not that some device be postulated. This is
presumably necessary on anybody’s theory, for the simple reason that there appear to be minimal
differences between English ‘I’ and Amharic ‘I’, or between ‘yesterday’ and ‘two days ago’. The
problem, however, is that the feature we postulated to encode these lexical stipulations is not
motivated independently. Ideally, one would like to couch these stipulations in a theoretical
vocabulary which is independently needed for other parts of the grammar; this does not seem to be
the case here.
-In the case of the agreement mechanism, it is not clear that any device is needed at all. As we will
see shortly, it is because of our particular implementation of the semantics that we had to stipulate
that features should not be interpreted in certain environments. We discuss the prospects for
eliminating this stipulation in what follows.
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6 An Alternative to the Filtering Mechanism: a semantic derivation of ±actual
The alternative to be presented here is semantically based. This new theory suggests that the
apparent contrast between matrix and embedded context variables is in fact the by-product of a
semantic difference which is independently motivated. In a nutshell, the semantic distinction
between ‘he’ and ‘I’, which is needed on everyone’s theory, will be seen to be sufficient to derive the
distinction between English ‘I’, Amharic ‘I’, and the Ewe and Gokana logophoric markers. The new
theory makes one surprising new prediction, which appear to be borne out.
6.1 Person
6.1.1 A simple version of the system
Consider first how the distinction between ‘he’ and ‘I’ can be captured in the present system.
Let us assume that 1st and 2nd person features contribute a presupposition that the value of the
relevant variable is speaker/hearer of the actual speech act:
(75) a. [[x {+author*(x)}]]s, c is defined only if s(x) is the author of c.  If so, [[x {+author*(x)}]]s, c
=s(x)
b. [[x {+hearer*(x)}]]s, c is defined only if s(x) is a hearer of c.  If so, [[x {+hearer*(x)}]]s, c
=s(x)
It is tempting to extend this system to 3rd person pronouns by positing a negative presupposition: a 3rd
person feature presupposes that the variable it appears on denotes neither the author nor a hearer of
the context c. We may decompose this into two independent statements of the following form, with
3rd person=[-1st person, -2nd person]:
(76) a. [[x {-author*(x)}]]s, c is defined only if s(x) is not the author of c
. 
 If so, [[x {-author*(x)}]]s, c
=s(x)
b. [[x {-hearer*(x)}]]s, c is defined only if s(x) is not a hearer of c
. 
 If so, [[x {-hearer*(x)}]]s, c
=s(x)
Although this system will have to be amended, it suffices to provide a derivation of the existence of
logophoric pronouns. Following our previous practice, we posit that indexicals of the Amharic
variety are simply specified for a feature +author, defined as a relation between an individual and a
context, and written as: +author(x, c). As with other grammatical features, we assume that this is
interpreted as a presupposition on the value of a variable:
(77) a. [[x {+author(x, ci)}]]s, c is defined only if s(x) is the author of s(ci).  If so,
[[x {+author(x, ci)}]]s, c =s(x)
b. [[x {+hearer(x, ci)}]]s, c is defined only if s(x) is a hearer of s(ci).  If so,
[[x {+hearer(x, ci)}]]s, c =s(x)
As before, we translate each pronoun with a variable, followed by a presupposition that represents
the contribution of the grammatical features of the pronoun. But we also want to say that in Amharic
a shifted 1st person pronoun can be dependent on the context variable introduced by an attitude
operator. If we stopped here this would not be possible, for we would have representations such as
the following, in which the variable ‘x’ appears free:
(78) a. Johni says that Ii am a hero (Amharic)
b. SAY<John, ..., ...>ci hero(x {+author(x, ci)}, ..., ...)
Since ‘x’  is free, its value cannot be affected by the attitude operator, contrary to what we want. To
solve this technical problem I introduce a mechanism of ‘definite closure’ by which an ι-operator can
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close off the free variable (the presupposition that follows the variable is then interpreted as the
restriction of the definite description; this is defined in Appendix II, C)46:
(79) SAY<John, ..., ...>ci hero(ιx{+author(x, ci)}, ..., ...)
If we don’t add any further stipulations, the only way we may define an element which is an
author of a speech act, but not the author of the actual speech act, is to assume that the relevant
pronoun is an indexical (i.e. a shiftable indexical, since this is now the only category there is) which
is specified as -author*. The relevant combination is thus the conjunction: (+author(x, c i) ∧  -
author*(x)), which (when preceded by the ι-operator) is interpreted as follows:
(80)  [[ιx {+author(x, ci) ∧ -author*(x)}]] c,s is undefined unless there is exactly one individual that
is both (i) author of s(ci) and (ii) not the author of c.
This would appear to be a good definition of logophoric pronouns, since these can only be used to
refer to the author of a reported speech- or thought- act. On the present account, this means that
logophoric pronouns may refer to the author of any context, except if that person is also the author of
the actual speech act (without the latter requirement the pronouns in question would simply be
shiftable 1st person pronouns of the Amharic variety). This makes an interesting prediction, which
did not follow from the preceding system, based on richly annotated Logical Forms. Previously there
was nothing to prevent a 1st person embedded verb from taking logophoric marking, since a pronoun
could bear logophoric marking if it was syntactically bound by a coordinate of an embedded context.
But on the present theory a 1st person logophoric pronoun would be a contradiction in terms, for by
definition a logophoric pronoun must have as its denotation something different from the author of
the actual speech act. This is best seen if we add the semantic condition on a 1st person pronoun (of
the English variety) to a logophoric pronoun. The result is:
(81) ιx {+author(x, ci) ∧ -author*(x) ∧ +author*(x)}
But of course this yields a referential failure in all cases, because of the contradiction between
-author*(x) and +author*(x)47.
The prediction, then, is that (author-denoting) logophoric pronouns should never appear in the
1st person. Typologically this prediction appears to be borne out, as this pattern is exceedingly rare.
Roncador 1988, who provides a survey of the literature, notes only one apparent exception to this
general absence: the logophoric marker which appears on the verb in Gokana can in principle be
applied to all persons48. Roncador relies on the description of Hyman & Comrie 1981. The latter
point out, however, that although logophoric marking is morphologically possible in the first person,
it is ‘dispreferred’, so that (82)b is degraded by comparison with (82)a:
(82) Gokana (Hyman & Comrie’s (11))
a. Ok:   mm~ kO mm~ dO~
    I said I fell
b. ‘Dispreferred to [a]’: mm~ kO mm~ dO~-E~
    I said I fell-LOG
The fact that (82)b appears to be relatively degraded is all the more striking since in the other persons
logophoric marking is preferred whenever it is possible; the opposite pattern is thus found in the first
                                                 
46
 Thanks to A. von Stechow for pointing out an important mistake in a previous version of this work.
47
 See Heim 2002 for an attempt to derive this prediction within a system in which indexical features are not interpreted,
but only provide an indication on the nature of the binders.
48
 He also discusses another potential case (Ngbaka), but concludes that we do not have clear evidence that logophoric
marking really occurs in the first person (Roncador 1988 p. 279).
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person49. Although far more fieldwork is needed to confirm these data, I take them to be preliminary
evidence in favor of the proposed theory50.   
6.1.2 Refinements
The presuppositions we have stated for -1st and -2nd person turn out to be too strong. Consider a
situation in which the identity of a person seen in a mirror is in doubt. I could very well utter the
following:
(83) He looks like me... Mmh, he must be me, in fact he is me!51
Clearly we do not want to make such a statement a presupposition failure, as is predicted on the
current theory.  Thus it does not have to be presupposed that a 3rd person pronoun does not denote the
speaker or hearer of the actual speech act. But it also wouldn’t do to say that ‘he’ carries no
presupposition whatsoever, for in a normal context ‘he’ cannot refer to the speaker (nor to the
hearer). The generalization appears to be that ‘he’ can be used whenever it is not presupposed that
the variable denotes the speaker or hearer of the actual speech act.  In effect, then, ‘he’ is used as a
semantic default. It would be an important enterprise to determine in more detail what it means to
presuppose that a variable denotes the speaker or hearer52. But for our purposes the following
statement should suffice:
(84) a. Use -author* just in case +author* would have yielded a presupposition failure.
b. Use -hearer* just in case +hearer* would have yielded a presupposition failure.
These conditions have the further advantage of allowing a variable marked with a 3rd person feature
to refer to the speaker under some (though not all) assignments. Consider for instance the following
sentence:
(85) Every man (including me) likes his mother.
Certainly the bound variable in a. should be allowed to range, among others, over the speaker. Under
the previous theory this would have been impossible, for a presupposition failure would have ensued.
But this is no longer the case under the revised theory.  It is clear that using a +author* feature on the
variable x would have resulted in presupposition failure. Therefore the use of -author* was licensed,
and similarly for -hearer*.
Of course in simpler cases we preserve our initial results: when there is no uncertainty about
who is who, and when the variable is not bound by a quantifier, a 3rd person feature forces the
variable to denote someone other than the actual speaker or hearer. And this suffices to define
logophoric pronouns. In addition to being empirically more adequate, the revised theory also has the
advantage of extending to an analysis of mood in German.
6.2 Extension to Mood
We take Stalnaker’s semantics of conditionals as our starting point, in that we define for every
context c a Common Ground CG(c), which is the set of worlds compatible with everything the
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 Hyman & Comrie 1981 and Roncador 1988 give a functional explanation of this asymmetry.
50
 A similar prediction is made about hearer-denoting logophoric pronouns, which have been claimed to exist in Mupun,
a Chadic language described by Frajzingier 1985 (a hearer-denoting logophoric pronoun refers to the hearer of a reported
speech act; see also Frayzingier 1993). If the present theory is on the right track, hearer-denoting logophoric pronouns
should never appear in the 2nd person. I do not know whether this prediction is borne out.
51
 If one prefers ‘this is me’ to ‘he is me’, one may consider negative statements, as suggested by an anonymous
reviewer: ‘He looks like me... but he isn’t me’. The second sentence should not come out as trivially true, since the
speaker asserts something non-trivial when he utters this in the mirror situation.
52
 This could be done along the following lines. Evaluate sentences with respect to a set G of assignments rather than
with respect to a single assignment g. A pronoun bearing index i would be presupposed to refer to a female individual
just in case for every assignment function g in G, g(i) is female. See Dekker 2000 for an analysis.
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speech act participants presuppose. In line with our treatment of the pronominal case, we posit the
following presuppositions for the indicative and subjunctive markings:
(86)  a. [[w {+indicative2*(w)}]]s, c is defined only if s(w) is in the Common Ground of c. If defined,
[[w {+indicative2*(w)}]]s, c=s(w)
b. ‘w {-indicative2*(w)}’ can be used only if marking ‘w’ with +indicative2* in the same
Logical Form would result in a presupposition failure.
This semantics is very close in spirit to Stalnaker 1975 and von Fintel 1997. In particular, non-
indicative marking is taken to have a very weak semantic contribution, since it only means that
indicative marking couldn't have been used.  The difference, however, is that the present analysis is
simply the application to mood of the analysis of person laid out in the preceding section.
In line with our treatment of logophoricity in the pronominal case, let us now see how we can
analyze the Konjunktiv I in German. First, we define a feature +indicative1(w, ci), which indicates
that w is the world of ci (this is just the ‘shiftable’ version of the feature +indicative1(w) defined in
Section 3.2.4; in the Appendix we use +indicative1(w) throughout). By analogy with our analysis of
logophoric pronouns, we posit the following feature combination for the German Konjunktiv I:
(87)   ιw{+indicative1(w, ci) ∧ -indicative2*(w)}
As in the pronominal case, this revised theory derives predictions which were not made by the
system based on richly annotated LFs. In a nutshell, whenever it is presupposed that s(w) is in the
Common Ground, the use of -indicative2*, and hence of the Konjunktiv I, should be precluded. This
appears to be the case, as demonstrated by the following (fairly robust) generalization:
(88) The Konjunktiv I cannot be used in the 1st person present singular of  ‘believe’.
Consider the following asymmetries:
(89) a.  *Ich  glaube, daß Maria krank sei
      I believe that  Maria sick is-KONJ1
b.  Ich  glaubte, daß Maria krank sei
      I believed that  Maria sick is-KONJ1
‘I believed that Maria was sick’
c.  Peter glaubt, daß Maria krank sei
      Peter believes that  Maria sick is-KONJ1
‘Peter believes that Maria is sick’
d.  Peter glaubte, daß Maria krank sei
      Peter believed that  Maria sick is-KONJ1
‘Peter believes that Maria is sick’
The Konjunktiv I can be used in every case except in the first person present. Why should that
be? The answer becomes apparent when it is observed that the set of worlds compatible with the
speaker’s belief at the time of utterance is always a subset of the Common Ground itself. As a result,
the presupposition projection rule for universally quantified statements entails that the indicative can
be used. But due to the definition of -indicative2*,  if +indicative2* can be used, it must  be used. This
derives the generalization (See Appendix II, C for an explicit derivation)53.
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 I leave two further points for future research. First, the same facts appear to hold for ‘say’ as for ‘believe’, as shown in
the following:
(i) a.  *Ich  sage, daß Maria krank sei
      I say that  Maria sick is-KONJ1
b. Ich sagte, daß Maria krank sei
   I said that  Maria sick is-KONJ1
   ‘I said that Maria was sick’
c.  Peter sagt, daß Maria krank sei
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7 Is there an alternative to the Agreement Mechanism?
Can we also get rid of our last stipulation, which was the agreement mechanism? The answer
will only be partly positive. In the person case, we may apparently do without an agreement
mechanism by introducing a slightly different semantics. But in the case of tense only part of the data
will be covered in this way. The data that motivated the introduction of ‘Sequence of Tense’ rules
will remain unaccounted for under the new system.
7.1 Reasons to get rid of the agreement mechanism
The agreement mechanism that was postulated in Section 5 had a major weakness: it was an
outright stipulation. The only motivation given was that such a mechanism was needed in order to
make the correct predictions; but this is just another way of saying that the theory was by itself
unable to account for part of the data, and had therefore to be supplemented with a stipulation.
7.1.1 Attempt at motivating the stipulation [Kratzer 1998, Schlenker 1999]
There have been several attempts at motivating this stipulation. One mechanism was offered in
Kratzer 1998, and criticized in Schlenker 1999. The latter suggested that the same kind of agreement
rule was needed to account for cases involving ‘only’ (first brought up by Heim 1991) and for the
case of attitude reports. As Heim observed, a 1st person pronoun can sometimes be used as a bound
variable. Furthermore, in such cases the person features do not appear to be interpreted at all, for if
they were they would presumably constrain the value of the pronoun (under an assignment) to be the
speaker of the actual speech act. But such is not always the case:
(90) a. Only I do my homework [... therefore Peter doesn’t do his]
b. [only I]i [ ti   do    myi  homework]
    Binding
 Morphological agreement
 
On the relevant reading ‘myi’ is treated as a variable bound by the subject trace, and thus indirectly
by the generalized quantifier ‘only I’. If the 1st person feature were interpreted, it would yield a
presupposition failure, since the bound variable ‘myi ’ must range over non-speakers:
(91) For a referential NP, [[[only NP]i φ]]s, c =1 iff for d=[[NP]s, c, [[φ]]s[i->d] c=1 and for all individual
d’≠d, [[φ]]s[i->d’], c=0
As can be seen, if ‘myi’ carries a presupposition that i denotes the speaker, the above semantics will
yield a presupposition failure.
                                                                                                                                                                     
          Peter says that  Maria  sick is-KONJ1
‘Peter says that Maria is sick’
Second, it appears that the Konjunktiv I can never be used after factives, as shown in the following:
(ii) a. Peter weiß, daß Maria krank ist
   Peter  knows that  Maria sick is
b. *Peter weiß, daß Maria krank sei
   Peter  knows that  Maria sick be
An appealing line of explanation would run as follows. Consider the semantics of ‘know’, analyzed as a quantifier over
contexts:
(iii) [[KNOW<x, t, w> ci: φ]]s, c=1 iff every context c’ compatible with what s(x) knows at s(t) in s(w) is such that:   [[φ]]s[ci-
>c’], c
=1.
This naive semantics seems to derive the result. Since ‘know’ is factive, a context can be compatible with what the agent
knows only if that context is part of the Common Ground. As a consequence, indicative marking can be used in the
embedded clause, and therefore it must be used. The problem, however, is that this naive semantics appears to be
incorrect, among others because it fails to yield an entailment from John knows that ϕ to John believes that ϕ. The reason
is that KNOW<x, t, w> only quantifies over contexts that lie in the Common Ground; whereas BELIEVE<x, t, w> has no such
restriction, unless x’s beliefs entail those of the speaker, which isn’t in general true.
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The problem is not unique to indexical features. Gender features on bound pronouns fail to be
interpreted in exactly the same environment [Heim & Kratzer 1998]:
(92) a. Only she did her homework [... therefore Peter doesn’t do his]
b.[only she]i[ ti did heri  homework]
       Binding
Morphological agreement
As in the preceding case, the semantics of ‘only’ implies that ‘heri’ must be evaluated under
assignments that do assign male individuals to the variable, which should yield a presupposition
failure, contrary to fact.
These examples are somewhat similar to those that were discussed above with respect to De
Se readings:
(93) John hopes λ<xi, t, w>  PROi to buy himselfi a car
Binding Binding
             Morphological Agreement
In both cases the morphological rule has the same flavor: an element inherits features that remain
uninterpreted from an element which is not its binder, but is syntactically close to its binder.
7.1.2 Why this motivation was dubious
Unfortunately it does not appear that the similarity goes any further than this. When the data
are considered in greater detail, it appears that (apart from De Se reports) there are two kinds of
environments in which features of bound pronouns may remain uninterpreted: (a) focus-sensitive
constructions, and (b) ellipsis resolution. Attitude reports do not appear to form a natural class with
either (a) or (b), and thus it is not obvious that a unification can be achieved54.
As has often been noted, a treatment of ‘only NP’ as a generalized quantifier is rather
implausible55, and can advantageously be replaced with a focus-based analysis. For our purposes this
has the added benefit of predicting other cases in which some feature may remain uninterpreted, as in
the following examples:
(94) a. Only I did my homework [Therefore John didn’t do his]
b. Even I did my homework [Therefore John also did his]
c. Even Mary did her homework [Therefore John also did his]
d. I did my homework.  [Implicature: John didn’t do his]
e. Mary did her homework. [Implicature: John didn’t do his]
In a focus-based analysis (à la Rooth 1996) (94)a can be given the following treatment, where ‘o’
stands for ‘ordinary value’ and ‘f’ stands for ‘focus value’. The important point is that the
mechanism that computes the focus value must be allowed to disregard the 1st person feature of
‘myx’, or else a presupposition failure will ensue56:
(95) a. ‘Only’ combining with a clause φ yields the assertion ∀p [p∈[[φ]]f, s, c & p(cw)] ⇒ p=[[φ]]o, s, c
b. The focus value [[IF  (λx tx did myx homework )]]f, s,  c is {[[I did my homework]], [[John did
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 However see Heim 2002 for a recent attempt in that direction. Heim argues (contra the present view) that certain
features must remain uninterpreted in a broader range of cases, for instance in ‘Few men brought their children’, where
the plural features on the bound variable ‘their’ makes no semantic contribution. Heim attempts to analyze attitude verbs
as ‘verbal quantifiers’ which, like ‘few students’, transmit certain features in the phonological component only.
55
 There are several reasons for this. (i) ‘only’ would be a determiner taking a referential expression rather than a
predicate as its first argument; (ii) in other cases, in which it would take a predicate as an argument (e.g. ‘Only students
came’), it would have to be non-conservative.
56
 Rooth’s intensional analysis would have to be slightly modified to be compatible with our extensional theory.
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his homework]], [[Mary did her homework]], ...}, i.e.57
{[[tx did myx homework )]]f, s[y->cA], c, [[tx did myx homework )]]f, s[y->John], c, [[tx did myx
homework )]]f, s[y->Mary], c ...}
(96)  a. φ=’Only I did my homework [Therefore John didn’t do his]’
b. LF: Only(C) [IF  [λx tx did myx homework]]
c. Presupposition: [[I
 
 [λx tx did myx homework]] ]]o, c, s=1
d. Assertion: ∀p [ [p∈[[φ]]f, c, s & p(cw)=1]⇒p=λw cA did cA’s homework in w]
Features that appear on bound pronouns may similarly be ignored in ellipsis constructions, at
least on the assumption that ellipsis is resolved by copying part of the antecedent at LF:
(97) a. I did my homework. John did too (i.e. John did his homework)
b. Mary did her homework. John did too (i.e. John did his homework)
‘John did my homework too’ and ‘John did her homework too’ would obviously yield a
presupposition failure unless ‘my’ and ‘her’ could somehow be ignored (syntacticians call this
phenomenon ‘vehicle change’).
How should these facts be handled? Two theories seem plausible:
-Theory A posits that the mechanisms that compute (a) focus values and (b) ellipsis resolution may
disregard features of bound pronouns. Elsewhere (in particular in sentences of the form NP λx φ)
features must be interpreted.
-Theory B posits that features present at LF are always interpreted,  but that in constructions of the
form NP λx φ the variable x may inherit the features of NP in the morphological component only, so
that these features are invisible at LF.
Theory A, which is a natural extension of the analysis presented here, posits that the features
of ‘my’ are interpreted on the bound variable in ‘I λx [tx did myx homework]’ (as was pointed out in
paragraph 3.2.3, this is perfectly compatible with standard rules of presupposition projection). Only
in the computation of ‘John did too’ is the 1st person feature ignored, somewhat along the following
lines58:
(98) (I like my mother and) John does too (bound variable reading)
a. Step 1 (Copying): John λx [tx did myx homework]
b. Step 2 (Vehicle change): John λx [tx did x’s homework]
What about focus constructions in this theory? If the focus value is construed as a set of propositions,
as in (99)b1,  we must stipulate that the mechanism that computes it may disregard certain features. If
it is construed as a set of logical forms, as in (99)b2, we may simply apply once again the mechanism
of vehicle change:
(99) IF did my homework (implicature: John didn’t do his)
a. Assertion: I λx [tx did myx homework]
b1. Focus value, construed as a set of propositions:
A={ [[y λx [tx did x’s homework]]]c, s[y->d](d): d an individual which is a contextually given
alternative to the speaker}
b2. Focus value, construed as a set of logical forms:
A={d λx [tx did x’s homework]: d a denoting expression which is a contextually given
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 This is a slight simplification. Rooth’s procedure would first yield: {[[ y
 
 (λx tx did myx homework )]]o, s[y->cA], c, [[ y  (λx
tx did myx homework )]]o, s[y->John], c  , [[ y  (λx tx did myx homework )]]o, s[y->Mary], c , ...}.
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 In Appendix II C (98)a would be written without λ as: John xm{+author*(xm)} do-the-homework-of(xm{+author*(xm)},
xm{+author*(xm)}) (I have further simplified the representation by omitting time and world variables).
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alternative to ‘I’}
d. Implicature: No element of A is both (i) strictly more informative than a. and (ii) true.
On Theory B, things are somewhat simpler. ‘I did my homework’ may appear at LF without
indexicals features in the variables, yielding: I λx [tx did x’s homework]. No problem arises either in
the computation of focus or in the resolution of ellipsis (note that although Theory B is compatible
with the rest of our theory, it makes our earlier observation on presupposition projection in bound
variable constructions unnecessary).
Neither Theory A nor Theory B extends naturally to De Se reports, and as a result the
agreement mechanism posited there stands as an outright stipulation, which it would be desirable to
eliminate (see Heim 2002 for a different view).
7.2 Alternative: De Re and Modes of Presentation
Let us now explore the possibility that, despite appearances, person features are always
interpreted in attitude reports. First, we note that in De Re readings of definite descriptions the
descriptive content is evaluated with respect to the actual world rather than with respect to the
agent’s belief worlds. The same observation applies to the presuppositions of gender features: ‘Ralph
believes of Ortcutt that he is a woman’ does not attribute to Ralph the contradictory thought that
someone is both male and female. Thus with De Re readings the gender features can in fact be
interpreted, though not with respect to the agent’s belief worlds/contexts. We can extend this solution
to De Se readings by positing that a De Se reading is just a De Re reading where the mode of
presentation of the res to the agent is linguistically specified in the report (the mode of presentation
must be indexical)59.
7.2.1 Quantifying In with Modes of Presentation
Let us first consider the issue of Quantifying In independently of the De Se problem. The
initial observation, due to Quine 1956, was that both of the following sentences may be
simultaneously true:
(100) a. Ralph believes, of Ortcutt, that he is a spy (qua the man in the brown hat)
b. Ralph believes, of Ortcutt, that he is not a spy (qua the man seen at the beach).
On the assumption that beliefs are closed under conjunction, a straightforward analysis would risk
attributing irrationality to Ralph. For instance, in a possible worlds framework Ralph would have to
believe that he lives in a world where (i) Ortcutt is a spy, and (ii) Ortcutt is not a spy. But there are
no such worlds, and therefore Ralph would believe the empty proposition. This fails to distinguish
irrational beliefs from cases of mistaken identity. Kaplan’s solution in ‘Quantifying In’ was to
reintroduce in his truth-conditions the mode of presentation under which Ralph held the relevant
belief. Simplifying somewhat, Kaplan’s analysis was the following: Ralph believes, of Ortcutt, that
he is a spy just in case there is some acquaintance relation α between Ralph and Ortcutt, and Ralph
believes (De Dicto) that whoever falls under α is a spy. This is represented more formally in the
following:
(101) a. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy
b. ∃α R(α, Ortcutt, Ralph) & Ralph believes α is a spy
c. R(α, x, Ralph) [‘α represents x to Ralph’] if and only if:
(i) α denotes x (ii) α is a name of x for Ralph and (iii) α is sufficiently vivid
Of course if we were to consider the De Re reading with a definite description (e.g. ‘Ralph
believes that the spy Ortcutt isn’t a spy’), it is clear that the content of the description would be
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 Abusch 1997 assumes that modes of presentation in attitude reports are left for the context to determine. She does not
assume that they can be linguistically specified. See also Reinhart 1991.
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evaluated with respect to the actual world rather than with respect to Ralph’s belief worlds. The same
result carries over to gender features. Given the notorious difficulty of giving a compositional
treatment of Kaplan’s suggestions, I simply stipulate that the ‘final’ logical form is not that in b., but
rather that in c., where quantification over modes of presentation is explicitly represented – and
where the variable x appears in an  extensional position:
(102) a. Ralph believes (of Bernard J. Ortcutt) that Okhe /#she is woman.
b. BELIEVE<Ralph, ..., ...> c woman (x{Ok-feminine(x) /#+feminine  ...}, ..., ...)
c. [∃α<c, e>: R(α, x {Ok-feminine(x) /#+feminine ...}, Ralph,...)]
BELIEVE<Ralph, ..., ...> c woman(α(c), ..., ...)
Crucially, the presupposition that follows the variable ‘x’ does not have to apply to the mode of
presentation α which is Ralph’s description of Bernard J. Ortcutt (Ralph may well think, incorrectly,
that Ortcutt is a woman; this won’t affect the fact that ‘x’ refers to a male individual).
The conclusion is that for De Re attitudes no problem arises with gender features, since these
are always interpreted outside the scope of the attitude operator. So why did we have a problem with
De Se readings? This was because we assumed that these were not De Re beliefs, and had a
representation in which the De Se pronoun was solely dependent on the embedded context (for
simplicity the embedded predicate is analyzed as taking a simple individual argument; the reflexive
is used only to show that PRO has masculine features):
(103) a. Ralph
 
hopes (to be a woman, and) PRO to be worthy of  Okhimself/#herself
b. LF: HOPE<Ralph, ..., ...>c worthy-of-self(ιx[{+author(c, x) ∧ Ok-feminine(x)/#+feminine(x)}, ...,
...)
If, as is plausible in a., every context c compatible with Ralph’s hope is one whose agent cA is a
woman, then the feature +feminine should be grammatical, while –feminine should yield a
presupposition failure. But exactly the opposite appears to hold.
There might be a way out, however. If we could treat De Se readings as a variety of De Re
readings, as has been suggested repeatedly in the literature, we could get out of this problem. Just as
in the De Re case considered above, the gender features that appear on the pronoun would then be
evaluated outside the scope of the attitude operator, and the unwanted predictions would disappear.
Of course since there exist De Se readings we have to ensure that something in the logical form
differentiates a simple De Re reading from a De Re reading which is also De Se.  Given that there is
a quasi-consensus on the fact that a De Se reading entails the corresponding De Re reading60, this can
be effected by simply adding in the logical form a predicate that specifies the nature of the
acquaintance relation (this partly follows a suggestion by B. Schein (p.c.)). In effect, then, this
theory says that ‘John hopes PRO to be elected’ is true if and only if Smith hopes, of Smith, that he
should be elected, under the description (the acquaintance relation): 'I'.  This solution has a cost,
however: we have to stipulate that part of the features of PRO (the gender features) can be ‘exported’
with the variable they appear on, while others (the shifted indexical features) must remain in the
scope of the attitude operator to constrain the choice of the mode of presentation (in the type-
theoretic notation, 'c' is the type of contexts):
(104) [∃α<c, e>: R(α, x {Ok-feminine(x) /#+feminine(x)...}, Ralph,...)]
HOPE<Ralph, ..., ...>c worthy-of-self(α(c){+author(c, x)}, ..., ...)
If we are ready to split the grammatical features of PRO in this fashion, no problem will arise. There
is now a direct dependency between PRO and its antecedent ‘Ralph’ (they are coindexed), so that the
variable x must have the individual Ralph as a value. Since Ralph is male (even if he wants to
become a woman), the feature +feminine is correctly excluded; only –feminine is allowed. Further,
since  +author(c, x) appears as a presupposition on the value of the description α(c), it makes the
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 For a dissenting view, see Schlenker 1999 (Appendix II to Chapter 2).
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existential quantification over α felicitous and true only in case Ralph has a hope of the form: ‘I am
worthy of myself’, in the 1st person.  This appears to be the correct result, with the benefit that all the
grammatical features that appear on PRO are in fact interpreted semantically, contrary to our
previous assumptions. The unsettling part, however, is that these features do not get interpreted in the
same place.
7.2.2 Remaining Problems with Tense
There is another problem with this solution.  Although we may have now solved the problem
of interpreting gender features on pronouns, we have lost our account of Sequence of Tense. This is
because, in the famous Kamp-Rohrer-Abusch example (repeated below), a De Re interpretation of
the past tense will still not yield the correct result:
(105) Abusch’s version of Kamp & Rohrer’s French examples
John decided a week ago that in ten days at breakfast he would say to his mother that they were
having their last meal together.
Even in case all the agents involved have perfect knowledge of the time, so that there is no
distinction between De Se and De Re with respect to time, the past tense features on the most
embedded tense cannot be interpreted, since this would imply that the time of the last meal is before
the utterance time, contrary to fact.  Thus the theory presented here does not extend to all temporal
cases. By contrast, the goal in Schlenker 1999 was to show that the same rules can account for tense
agreement and for person agreement. The latter is now accounted for without agreement rule at all,
but the theory of tense is back where it was before this entire endeavor – with an unpleasant need for
special stipulations. I conclude that an alternative to the agreement mechanism has yet to be fully
worked out. By contrast, the alternative to the filtering mechanism discussed in Section 6 did appear
to be a net improvement over the previous version of the theory61.
8 Extensions
I now discuss very briefly two possible extensions of the present theory.
8.1 Vagueness62
In unpublished work, Yael Sharvit has suggested that standards of measurement for vague
predicates should be treated as shiftable indexicals. An argument for doing so could be derived from
the following contrast:
(106) a. #John’s height is 1m50 and he is thus short, and rather unhappy. But if he were the same
height but were tall, he would be much happier.
b. John’s height is 1m50 and he is thus short. But although his mother knows his real height
she thinks that he is tall.
The second sentence of (106)a is infelicitous because it would seem that there are no worlds
(compatible with what is presupposed at that point) in which John is 1m50 and is tall: the first
sentence has already established that 1m50 makes one short, not tall. This reasoning, however, can
go through only on the assumption that the standard of tallness is the same across possible worlds.
This, in turn, suggests that the standard is fixed by the context of speech rather than by a world of
evaluation.  But on the present theory this still leaves two possibilities open: the standard may be
fixed by any context or only by the context of the actual speech act.  (106)b suggests that the first
possibility is the correct one: John’s mother isn’t mistaken about John’s height, but rather about what
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 U. Sauerland (p.c.) notes that a theory without an Agreement Mechanism may systematically fail for examples with
plurals such as the following:
(i)  We all sometimes believe that we're the only person in the world. See also Heim 2002.
I do not know how such an example could be treated in the theory of Section 7.2.
62
 Thanks to Yael Sharvit and to Chris Barker for discussions on this topic.
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the standard of tallness is. This may be analyzed as follows, where the standard of tallness dtall is
treated as a shiftable indexical, which may thus take the context variable ci as argument (tall(John, d,
time(ci), world(ci)) should be read as: d is the maximal degree such that John is tall to that degree at
time(ci) in world(ci)]
(107) BELIEVE<x*, t*, w*> ci ([ιd: tall(John, d, time(ci), world(ci))] > dtall(ci))
8.2 Expressives
 Kaplan has recently tried to extend the logical insights of Demonstratives to the study of
expressives (Kaplan 2001). Within the present system, his primary example, ‘oops’, can be analyzed
as introducing a presupposition that the author of the actual speech (at the time and world of that
speech act) has ‘just observed a minor mishap’:
(108) [[oops φ]]s, c is undefined unless the agent of c has just observed a minor mishap at the time of c
in the world of c. If defined, [[oops φ]]s, c=[[φ]]s, c
I wrote this rule in a Kaplanian fashion, with ‘oops’ depending only on the context of the actual
speech act. The connection with the semantics of indexicals should be obvious. Unsurprisingly,
Kaplan makes anew the observation that expressives, like indexicals, do not appear to be shiftable.
But is this always true? Maybe not. While (109)a is definitely odd, and suggests that (as Kaplan
claims) ‘honky’ introduces a presupposition that the speaker has a negative attitude towards
Caucasians at the time and world of the speech act, (109)b sounds far more coherent:
(109) a. #I am not prejudiced against Caucasians. But if I were, you would be the worst honky I
know.
b. I am not prejudiced against Caucasians. But John, who is, thinks/claims that you are the
worst honky he knows.
The same point could be made with examples suggested by A. Kratzer, which involve (German
equivalents of) the word ‘really’, used to indicate that the speaker asserts a sentence with particular
force. Although it isn’t clear how ‘really’ should be analyzed, it is clear that whatever attitude is
ascribed to the speaker in (110)a is ascribed to the agent John in (110)b, which would suggest that
‘really’ is a shiftable expressive:
(110) a. Direct discourse: ‘Mary is really pregnant’.
b. Indirect discourse: John said that Mary was really pregnant.
 While this is all very preliminary –not least because the theory of expressives is in its infancy- it
appears that we might be able to replicate with expressives the typology we observed with
indexicals: some are unshiftable, but others can be shifted in attitude reports.
9 Conclusion
Monsters do exist in natural language.  Each time we report somebody’s speech or thought we
use one. While the facts are particularly striking in Amharic, they are just as real in English, as is
witnessed by the shiftability of ‘two days ago’. The general picture is now the following:
(i) Why do monsters exist? Because Frege’s insight was in fact correct: even when indexicality is
brought into the picture, the same semantic object is responsible for the cognitive significance of a
matrix sentence and for the truth-conditional contribution of a clause embedded under an attitude
verb. In a possible-worlds framework this object can be identified with be a property of contexts, as
was suggested originally in Lewis 1979. The implementation of this insight requires a system which
has at least the expressive power of full quantification over contexts, but this technical fact is not
special to indexicality, since the grammar of tense and mood also requires the apparatus of full
quantification over times and possible worlds.
44
(ii) Why are some indexicals (e.g. English ‘I’) unshiftable? This turned out to be the complement of
the question: Why do some indexicals (namely the logophoric pronouns) have to be shifted? While
the problem can be treated either in syntactic terms (with richly annotated logical forms) or with a
semantic stipulation, the latter solution appears preferable, among others because it derives certain
puzzling asymmetries in the use of logophoric pronouns and of logophoric mood.
(iii) How are the agreement facts with De Se readings to be accounted for? For person no special
mechanism is needed if one is willing to change slightly the semantics of De Se readings, and to
posit a somewhat stipulative LF syntax for Quantifying In. In the case of tense, however, this only
accounts for part of the data, and some Sequence of Tense rule is still needed in the end.
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Appendix I.
Expressive Power Arguments: Translation Procedures
In the following we provide translation procedures from First-Order Logic into Temporal
English, Modal English and Attitudinal English63. In the first two cases the existence of the
translation derives the conclusion drawn by Cresswell 1990: the full power of quantification over
times and worlds is needed to analyze temporal and modal talk in English. The present argument is
somewhat simpler that Cresswell’s,  however, since our fragments do not involve any individual
quantifiers.  By contrast, Cresswell 1990 had to consider the interaction between individual and
temporal or modal quantifiers to reach his conclusion.
♦ From First-Order Logic into Temporal English
(i) T(Rxi1...xin) = ... theni1 ... thenin...
 where ‘...’ stands for a translation of R, for instance (for n=2): it rains more theni1 than it rains thenin
(ii) T(¬φ) = it is not the case that T(φ)
(iii) T(φ∧ψ) = T(φ) and T(ψ)
(iv) T(∀xiφ) = alwaysi, when 1=1, it is the case that T(φ)
-Examples:
T(∀x1Px1)=always1, when 1=1, ...then1...
e.g. always1, when 1=1, it is the case that then1  it rains.
T(∀x1∀x2Rx1x2)= always1, when 1=1, it is the case that always2, when 1=1, it is the case that ... then1
... then2...
e.g. always1, when 1=1, it is the case that always2, when 1=1, it is the case that it rains then1 more
than it rains then2.
♦ From First-Order Logic into Modal English
(i) T(Rxi1...xin) = ... theni1 ... thenin...
 where ‘...’ stands for a translation of R, for instance (for n=2): it rains more theni1 than it rains thenin
(ii) T(¬φ) = it is not the case that T(φ)
(iii) T(φ∧ψ) = T(φ) and T(ψ)
(iv) T(∀xiφ) = necessarily, if 1=1, it is the case that T(φ)
-Examples:
T(∀x1Px1) = necessarily1, if 1=1, ...then1...
e.g. necessarily1, if 1=1, it is the case that then1  it rains.
T(∀x1∀x2Rx1x2)= necessarily1, if 1=1, it is the case that necessarily2, if 1=1, it is the case that ...
then1 ... then2...
e.g. necessarily1, if 1=1, it is the case that necessarily2, if 1=1, it is the case that it rains then1 more
than it rains then2.
♦ From First-Order Logic into Attitudinal English
 The difficulty here is to find an attitude verb in English that quantifies unrestrictedly over all
possible worlds (rather than over the possible worlds compatible with the agent’s attitude). If we
could stipulate that, say, the verb  ‘conceives’ had this property (John conceives that φ is true iff
some world satisfies φ), we could simply use the translation T* below, replacing line (iv) with:
T*(∃xiφ)=he conceivesi that T*(φ). Alternatively, we can follow the procedure outlined below, which
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 Note that these fragments of English include indices to disambiguate binding dependencies.  If one wanted to translate
First-Order Logic into Individual English (=a fragment that includes individual quantifiers such as ‘everything’), these
indices would of course be needed as well.
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yields a translation T that is adequate only on those models in which it is possible for an individual
(call him X) to have no beliefs whatsoever. This assumption makes the accessibility relation
‘compatible with X’s beliefs’ vacuous, since all worlds should be compatible with the beliefs of
someone who suspends judgment on everything...
-Auxiliary Translation:
 (i) T*(Rxi1...xin) = the way things are1 and ... and the way things aren stand in
relation R if n≥2
the way things are1 has property R  if n=1
 (ii) T*(¬φ) = it is not the case that T*(φ)
 (iii) T*(φ∧ψ) = T*(φ) and T*(ψ)
 (iv) T*(∀xiφ) = he believesi that T*(φ)
-Final Translation: For any formula φ, T(φ)=Suppose someone doesn’t have any beliefs whatsoever.
Then T*(φ).
-Examples:
T(∀x1Rx1)=Suppose someone doesn’t have any beliefs whatsoever. Then he believes1 that the way
things are1  has property R.
T(∀x1∀x2Rx1x2)=Suppose someone doesn’t have any beliefs whatsoever. Then he believes1 that he
believes2 that the way things are1 and the way things are2 stand in relation R.
Appendix II.
Formal Systems
A. ELD: An Extensional Version of Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives (with ‘Say’)
♦ Primitive Symbols
-Punctuation: (, )
-Variables: an infinite set of individual variables: xi∈Vindividuals,; an infinite set of time variables:
ti∈Vtimes;, an infinite set of world variables: wi∈Vworlds
-Predicates: for all natural numbers p, q, r, an infinite number of p-q-r-place predicates. Among
them: ‘exist’, ‘be-elected’, which are 1-1-1 predicates
-Names: John, Napoleon, Hume
-Indexicals: I, now, actually
-Sentential connectives: ∧, ∨, ¬, ⇒, ⇔
-Identity: =
-Quantifiers: ∀, Alw, Nec
-Attitude operator: SAY
♦ Syntax
• Terms
-If α∈Vindividuals, or α=’John’, ‘Napoleon, ‘Hume’ or α=’I’,  α is an individual term.
-If β∈Vtimes, or β=’now’, β is a time term.
-If γ∈Vworlds, or γ=’actually’, γ is a world term.
• Formulas
-If π is an p-q-r place predicate, α1, ..., αp are individual terms, β1, ..., βq are time terms, and γ1, ..., γr
are world terms, then π(α1, ..., αp, β1, ..., βq, γ1, ..., γr) is a formula.
-If φ and ψ are formulas, then (φ ∧ ψ), (φ ∨ ψ), ¬φ, (φ⇒ψ), (φ⇔ψ) are formulas.
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-If φ is a formula and α∈Vindividuals, β∈Vtimes, γ∈Vworlds, and α’∈Tindividuals, β’∈Ttimes, γ’∈Tworlds,then
∀αφ, Alwβφ, Necγφ and SAY<α’, β’, γ’> γφ are formulas.
♦ Semantics
• Definition
A is a model for the extensional language of demonstratives iff there are X, T, W, C such that:
 (i) A=<X, T, W, C, I>
(ii) C, the set of contexts, is non-empty, and furthermore if c∈C:
a. cA ∈X (the agent of c)
b. cT ∈T (the time of c)
c. cW ∈W (the world of c)
(iii) X, T, W, C are non-empty sets and have pair-wise an empty intersection with each other.
(iv) I, the interpretation function, assigns
-to each predicate an extension, as follows:
If π is an p-q-r place predicate, for all contexts c,  Ic(π)⊆Xp× Tq× Wr
-to each name α an extension, for all contexts c: Ic(α)∈X
-to each indexical, an extension (which depends on the context):
Ic(I)= cA
Ic(now)= cT
Ic(actually)= cW
-It is further stipulated that for all c∈C,
< cA, cT, cW>∈ Ic(exist) (the agent of a context exists at the time of the context in the world of the
context)
 (v) K assigns to each triple <x, t, w> ∈ X× T× W a set of Characters (the set of thoughts compatible
with x’s claim at t in w), where a Character is any element of ({0,1}W)C
Note: Instead of taking as primitive the set of Characters compatible with someone’s claim, we could
derive it from the notion: ‘context c is compatible with x’s claim at t in w’. The definition would run
as follows (von Stechow):
k is compatible with x’s claim at t in w=: for all c compatible with x’s claim at t in w, k(c)(cW)=1.
1. If α is a variable, [[α]]c, s=s(α). If α is a name or an indexical, [[α]]c, s=Ic(α)
2. [[π(α1, ..., αp, β1, ..., βq, γ1, ..., γr)]]c, s=1 iff <[[α1]]c, s, ..., [[αp]]c, s, [[β1]]c, s, ..., [[βq]]c, s, [[γ1]]c, s, ...,
[[γr]]c, s>∈Ic(π)
3. [[(φ ∧ ψ)]]c, s=1 iff [[φ]]c, s=1 and [[ψ]]c, s=1
[[(φ ∨ ψ)]]c, s=1 iff [[φ]]c, s=1 or [[ψ]]c, s=1
[[(φ ⇒ ψ)]]c, s=0 iff [[φ]]c, s=1 and [[ψ]]c, s=0
[[(φ ⇔ ψ)]]c, s=1 iff [[φ]]c, s=[[ψ]]c, s
[[¬φ ]]c, s=1 iff [[φ ]]c, s=0
4. Quantification
a. [[∀αφ]]c, s=1 iff for all x∈X, [[φ]]c, s[α−>x]=1
b. [[Alwβφ]]c, s=1 iff for all t∈T, [[φ]]c, s[β−>t]=1
c. [[Necγφ]]c, s=1 iff for all w∈W, [[φ]]c, s[γ−>w]=1
5. Attitude operators
[[SAY<α’, β’, γ’> γφ]] c, s=1 iff there exists k in K(<[[α’]]c, s, [[β’]]c, s, [[γ’]]c, s>) such that
(i) k(<[[α’]]c, s, [[β’]]c, s, [[γ’]]c, s>)= λw[[φ]] c, s[γ−>w]
(ii) [[α’]]c, s says k at [[β’]]c, s in [[γ’]]c, s
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Remarks
(i) ‘I actually exist now’ is true in every context, since:
[[exist(I, now, actually)]]c, s=1 iff < cA, cT, cW>∈I(exist), which is true by stipulation.
(ii) ‘I necessarily exist now’ may be false, since:
[[Nec wi exist(I, now, wi)]]c, s=1 iff for all w∈W, [[exist(I, now, wi)]]c, s[wi−>w]=1, which does not have
to be true.
(iii) ‘John says that John (he) is elected’ can be true (among others) if John’s utterance was of the
form ‘I am elected’ or ‘John/he is elected’, since:
[[SAY<John, now, actually>wi be-elected(John, now, wi)]] c, s=1 iff there exists k in K(<[[John]]c, s,[[now]]c,
s
,[[actually]]c, s>), i.e. in K(<John, cT, cW>) such that:
(i) k(<John, cT, cW>)= λw[[be-elected(John, now, wi)]] c, s[wi−>w]
(ii) John says k at cT in cW
• If John says: ‘I am elected’ [i.e. be-elected(I, now, actually)], he says the character: k*=λc λw [[be-
elected(I, now, wi)]] c, s[wi->w]. Since k*(<John, cT, cW>)=λw [[be-elected(I, now, wi)]] <John, cT, cW>, s[wi-
>w]
= λw [[be-elected(John, now, wi)]] <John, cT, cW>, s[wi->w], the report is true.
• If John says: ‘John is elected’ [i.e. be-elected(John, now, actually)], he says the character: k*=λc
λw [[be-elected(John, now, wi)]] c, s[wi->w]. Since k*(<John, cT, cW>)=λw [[be-elected(John, now, wi)]]
<John, cT, cW>, s[wi->w]
,  the report is true.
(iv) Zeevat’s Observation: ‘John says that he (John) is Hume’ is true iff ‘John says that he (John)
is Napoleon’ is true, since:
[[SAY<John,  now, actually> wi John=Hume]] c, s=1 iff [[SAY<John,  now, actually> wi John=Napoleon]]c,s=1 (this is
because λw[[John=Hume]] c, s[wi−>w]=Ø=λw[[John=Napoleon]] c, s[wi−>w]).
B. MEL: A Monster-Friendly Extensional Logic of Demonstratives with Attitude Operators
(This system illustrates in a simplified form the main semantic ideas of the paper. However it deals
neither with the Agreement Problem nor with the Filtering Problem).
Same as I., except:
♦ Primitive Symbols
-Add the 1-place context functors :
agent
time
world
two-days-ago
-Add the 0-1-1 predicate: rain
-Add the time quantifier: PAST
-Add the attitude operator HOPE
- Add an infinite set of context variables: ci∈Vcontexts
♦ Syntax
Replace the definitions with:
• Terms
-If α∈Vindividuals, or α=’John’, ‘Napoleon, ‘Hume’ or α=’I’,  α is an individual term.
-If β∈Vtimes, or β=’now’, β is a time term.
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-If γ∈Vworlds, or γ=’actually’, γ is a world term.
-If δ∈Vcontexts, δ  is a context term, agent(δ) is an individual term, time(δ) and two-days-ago(δ)  are
time terms, world(δ) is a world term.
• Formulas
-If π is an p-q-r-s place predicate, α1, ..., αp are individual terms, β1, ..., βq are time terms,  γ1, ..., γr are
world terms, and δ1, ..., δs are context terms, then π(α1, ..., αp, β1, ..., βq, γ1, ..., γr, δ1, ..., δs) is a
formula.
-If φ and ψ are formulas, then (φ ∧ ψ), (φ ∨ ψ), ¬φ, (φ⇒ψ), (φ⇔ψ) are formulas.
-If φ is a formula and β∈Vtimes, Past βφ is a formula.
-If φ  is a formula and α∈Vindividuals, β∈Vtimes, γ∈Vworlds, δ∈Vcontexts, and α ’∈Tindividuals, β’∈Ttimes,
γ’∈Tworlds,then ∀αφ, Alwβφ, Necγφ, SAY<α’, β’, γ’>δφ and HOPE<α’, β’, γ’>δφ are formulas.
♦ Semantics
• Definition
(iv) Replace the first line with:
-to each predicate an extension, as follows:
If π is an p-q-r-s place predicate, for all contexts c,  Ic(π)⊆Xp× Tq× Wr× Cs
(v) Replace with:
KSAY and KHOPE each assigns to each triple <x, t, w> ∈ X× T× W a set of contexts (=those contexts
compatible with x’s claim/hope at t in w).
Functors
Add:
I, the interpretation function, assigns for all contexts c:
Ic(agent)=that function f defined over contexts such that for each c’∈C, f(c’)= c’A.
Ic(time)=that function f defined over contexts such that for each c’∈C, f(c’)= c’T.
Ic(world)=that function f defined over contexts such that for each c’∈C, f(c’)= c’W.
Ic(two-days-ago)=that function f defined over contexts such that for each c’∈C, f(c’)= c’T. –2 days
(this assumes that the set of moments is ordered, etc.)
Add 1’. and replace the other lines by their new version:
1’. If α is a term and f is a functor, [[fα]]c, s= Ic(f)([[α]]c, s)
2. [[π(α1, ..., αp, β1, ..., βq, γ1, ..., γr, δ 1, ..., δs)]]c, s=1 iff <[[α1]]c, s, ..., [[αp]]c, s, [[β1]]c, s, ..., [[βq]]c, s,
[[γ1]]c, s, ..., [[γr]]c, s, [[δ1]]c, s , ..., [[δs]]c, s>∈Ic(π)
4. Quantification
Add:
d. [[Pastβφ]]c, s=1 iff for some t∈T such that t< cT, [[φ]]c, s[β−>t]=1
5. Attitude operators
Replace with:
[[SAY<α’, β’, γ’> δφ]]c, s=1 iff for all c'∈KSAY(<[[α’]]c, s, [[β’]]c, s, [[γ’]]c, s>): [[φ]] c, s[δ−>c'] =1
[[HOPE<α’, β’, γ’> δφ]]c, s=1 iff for all c'∈KHOPE(<[[α’]]c, s, [[β’]]c, s, [[γ’]]c, s>): [[φ]] c, s[δ−>c'] =1
Derivations
 (i) a. John hopes to be elected  (is unambiguously ‘De Se’)
b. HOPE<John,now,actually>ci be-elected(agent(ci), time(ci), world(ci))
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c. [[(b)]]c,s =1 iff for all c’∈KHOPE(<John, cT., cW>), [[be-elected(agent(ci), time(ci),
world(ci))]]c, s[ci−>c’]=1, iff for all c’∈KHOPE(<John, cT., cW>), <c’A, c’T, c’w>∈Ic(be-elected)
(ii) a. John hopes to be Hume  (is not equivalent to: John hopes to be Napoleon)
b. HOPE<John,now,actually>ci agent(ci)=Hume
c. [[(b)]]c,s =1 iff for all c’∈KHOPE(<John, cT., cW>), [[agent(ci)=Hume]]c, s[ci−>c]=1, iff for all
c’∈KHOPE(<John, cT., cW>), c’A= Ic(Hume)
 (iii) a. Johni hopes that hei, John, is elected (has a De Re, non-De Se reading)
b. HOPE<John,now,actually>ci be-elected(John, time(ci), world(ci))
c. [[(b)]]c,s =1 iff for all c’∈KHOPE(<John, cT., cW>), [[be-elected(John, time(ci), world(ci))]]c,
s[ci−>c’]
=1, iff for all c’∈KHOPE(<John, cT., cW>), <John, c’T, c’w>∈Ic(be-elected)
(iv) a. John hopes that he himself is elected / John hopes that he* is elected (Ewe)
b. Same as (ib)
c. Same as (ic)
(v) a. Johni says that Ii am elected (Amharic) (has a De Se reading with a shifted indexical)
b. SAY<John,now,actually>ci be-elected(agent(ci), time(ci), world(ci))
c. [[(b)]]c,s =1 iff for all c’∈KSAY(<John, cT., cW>), [[be-elected(agent(ci), time(ci), world(ci))]]c,
s[ci−>c]
=1, iff for all c’∈KSAY(<John, cT., cW>), <c’A, c’T, c’w>∈Ic(be-elected)
(vi) a. John says that I am elected (English) (does not have a shifted reading)
b. SAY<John,now,actually>ci be-elected(I, time(ci), world(ci))
c. [[(b)]]c,s =1 iff for all c’∈KSAY(<John, cT., cW>), [[be-elected(I, time(ci), world(ci))]]c,
s[ci−>c]
=1, iff for all c’∈KSAY(<John, cT., cW>), <cA, c’T, c’w>∈Ic(be-elected)
(vii) a. John said that it had rained two days ago (English) (has a De Se reading with a shifted
indexical)
 b. Past tk SAY<John,tk,actually>ci rain(two-days-ago(ci), world(ci))
 c. [[(b)]]c,s =1 iff for some t∈T before cT, for all c’∈KSAY(<John, t., cW>), [[rain(two-days-
ago(ci), world(ci))]]c, s[ci−>c’]=1, iff for some t∈T before cT, for all c’∈KSAY(<John, t., cW>), <c’T-2days,
cw>∈Ic(rain)
C. MELP: A Monster-Friendly Logic of Demonstratives with Partiality and Attitude Operators
(This system presents a more sophisticated version of the theory than MEL. The Filtering Problem is
addressed in a semantic fashion, along the lines of Section 6. The Agreement Problem, discussed in
Section 7,  is not addressed).
Primitive Symbols
-Punctuation: (, )
-Variables: an infinite set of individual variables, Vindividuals,={xi: i∈|N}; an infinite set of time
variables, Vtimes={ti: i∈|N};  an infinite set of world variables: Vworlds={wi: i∈|N}; an infinite set of
context variables: Vcontexts={ci: i∈|N}
-Individual functor: mother is 1-place individual functor.
-Predicates: for all natural numbers p, q, r, s, an infinite number of p-q-r-s place predicates. Among
them: ‘exist’, ‘speak’, ‘be-elected’, ‘be-addressed’, ‘female’, ‘sick’, which are 1-1-1-0 predicates;
‘like’ is a 2-1-1-0 predicate.
-Features:
a. +feminine, -feminine, +author*, -author*, +hearer*, -hearer*, which are 1-0-0-0 predicates.
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b. +author, -author, +hearer, -hearer, which are 1-0-0-1 predicates
c. +present, -present, which are 0-1-0-1 predicates
d. +present*, -present*, which are 0-1-0-0 predicates
e. +indicative1, -indicative1, which are 0-0-1-1 predicates
f. +indicative1*, -indicative1*, +indicative2*, -indicative2*, which are 0-0-1-0 predicates
-Names: John, Napoleon, Hume, Mary
-Sentential connectives: ∧, ¬
-Identity: =
-Quantifiers: ∀, Alw, Nec
-Definite closure operator: ι
-Attitude operators: SAY, HOPE, BELIEVE, KNOW
♦ Syntax
• Complex features
-If π is an p-q-r-s place feature, α1, ..., αp are individual variables, β1, ..., βq are time variables,
γ1, ..., γr are world variables, and δ1, ..., δs are context variables, then π(α1, ..., αp, β1, ...βq, γ1 ...γr,
δ1, ... δs) is a complex feature.
-If φ and ψ are complex features, then (φ ∧ ψ) is a complex feature.
Note: Only conjunctions of features are allowed. Features cannot be negated.
• Terms
Let φ be any complex feature.
-If α∈Vindividuals, α, α{φ} and  ια{φ} are individual terms.
-If α is a name,  α is an individual term
-If f is a one place individual functor, and if α is an individual term, so is fα
-If β∈Vtimes, β, β{φ} and ιβ{φ} are time terms.
-If γ∈Vworlds, γ, γ{φ} and ιγ{φ} are world terms.
-If δ∈Vcontexts, δ  is a context term.
Note: {φ} is a presupposition on the value of the preceding element.
• Formulas
-If π is an p-q-r-s place predicate, α1, ..., αp are individual terms, β1, ..., βq are time terms,  γ1, ..., γr are
world terms, and δ1, ..., δs are context terms, then π(α1, ..., αp, β1, ...βq, γ1 ...γr, δ1, ... δs) is a formula.
-If φ and ψ are formulas, then (φ ∧ ψ), ¬φ are formulas.
-If φ is a formula, ATT an attitude operator, and α∈Vindividuals, β∈Vtimes, γ∈Vworlds, δ∈Vcontexts, and
α’∈Tindividuals, β’∈Ttimes, γ’∈Tworlds,then ∀αφ, Alwβφ, Necγφ, ATT<α’, β’, γ’>δφ are formulas.
- If φ is a formula and α∈Vindividuals, β∈Vtimes, γ∈Vworlds, and if α’,  β’ and γ’ are an individual, a time
and a world term respectively, then:
α’αφ, β’βφ, γ’γφ are formulas.
Note: Terms can optionally be used as variable binding devices. This is useful to analyze bound
variable readings.
♦ Semantics
• Definition
A is a model for the extensional language of demonstratives iff there are X, T, W, C, I, K such that:
 (i) A=<X, T, W, C, I, K>
(ii) C, the set of contexts, is non-empty, and furthermore if c∈C:
a. cA ∈X (the agent of c)
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b. cT ∈T (the time of c)
c. cW ∈W (the world of c)
(iii) X, T, W, C are non-empty sets and have pair-wise an empty intersection with each other.
(iv) For each attitude operator ATT, KATT assigns to each triple <x, t, w> ∈ X× T× W a set of
contexts (=those contexts compatible with x’s attitude at t in w). It is further assumed that:
(v) I, the interpretation function, assigns
-to each predicate an extension, as follows:
If π is an p-q-r-s place predicate, for all contexts c,  Ic(π)⊆Xp× Tq× Wr× Cs
-to each name an extension, for all contexts c: Ic(John),  Ic(Napoleon),  Ic(Hume) ∈X
-It is further stipulated that for all c∈C, x∈X, t∈T, w∈W:
< cA, cT, cW>∈Ic(exist) (the agent of a context exists at the time of the context in the world of
the context)
< cA, cT, cW>∈Ic(speak) (the agent of a context speaks at the time of the context in the world of
the context)
-Extension of the features:
Ic(+feminine)={x: <x, cT, cW>∈Ic(female)}
Ic(+author*)={cA}
Ic(+hearer*)⊆{x: <x, cT, cW>∈Ic(be-addressed)}
Ic(+present*)={cT}
Ic(+indicative1*)={cW}
Ic(+author)={<c’A, c’>: c’∈C}
Ic(+hearer)⊆{<x, c’>: <x, c’T,  c’W>∈Ic(be-addressed)}
Ic(+present)={<c’T, c’>: c’∈C}
Ic(+indicative1)={<c’W, c’>: c∈C}
Ic(+indicative2*)={c’W: c’∈ KBELIEVE< cA, cT, cW>}
The negative features have as extension the entire relevant domain (i.e. they have no semantic
contribution. There is, however, a restriction on their use, stated below).
Note: indicative1* is a predicate that asserts that a world w is the world of the context of the actual
utterance. indicative1 is a relation that asserts that a world w is the world of a context c. Finally,
indicative2* is a predicate that asserts of a world w that w is in the Common Ground (in Stalnaker’s
sense), i.e. that it is one of those worlds that are compatible with the speaker’s belief at the time of
utterance.
(vi) For all c∈C,  Ic(mother)∈ {x: x∈ Ic(+feminine)}X
• Reference and Satisfaction
1. If α is a name, [[α]]c, s=Ic(α)
If α is a variable of type τ (τ=individual, time, world) and if φ is a complex feature:
[[α]]c, s=s(α)
[[α{φ}]]c, s=# iff [[φ]]c, s=0.
[[α{φ}]]c, s= s(α) iff [[φ]]c, s≠0
[[ια{φ}]]c, s=# iff there is zero or strictly more than one d in X (if τ=individual) or T (if τ=time) or W
(if τ=world) satisfying: [[φ]]c, s[α->d]=0. Otherwise,
[[ια{φ}]c, s= the unique d in X (if τ=individual) or T (if τ=time) or W (if τ=world) satisfying: [[φ]]c,
s[α->d]
=0.
Note: The definite closure operator is a variable binding device, which has on {φ} the same effect
as a standard definite description operator.
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If f is a 1-place individual functor, [[fα]]c, s= Ic(f)([[α]]c, s)
2. [[π(α1, ..., αp, β1, ...βq, γ1 ...γr, δ1, ... δs)]]c, s=1 iff none of [[α1]]c, s, ..., [[αp]]c, s, [[β1]]c, s, ..., [[βq]]c, s,
[[γ1]]c, s, ..., [[γr]]c, s, [[δ1]]c, s , ..., [[δs]]c, s is #, and <[[α1]]c, s, ..., [[αp]]c, s, [[β1]]c, s, ..., [[βq]]c, s, [[γ1]]c, s,
..., [[γr]]c, s, [[δ1]]c, s , ..., [[δs]]c, s>∈Ic(π)
[[π(α1) ...(αp) (β1) ...(βq) (γ1) ...(γr) (δ1) ... (δs)]]c, s=0 iff none of [[α1]]c, s, ..., [[αp]]c, s, [[β1]]c, s, ...,
[[βq]]c, s, [[γ1]]c, s, ..., [[γr]]c, s, [[δ1]]c, s , ..., [[δs]]c, s is #, and <[[α1]]c, s, ..., [[αp]]c, s, [[β1]]c, s, ..., [[βq]]c, s,
[[γ1]]c, s, ..., [[γr]]c, s, [[δ1]]c, s , ..., [[δs]]c, s>∉Ic(π)
3. [[(φ ∧ ψ)]]c, s=1 iff [[φ]]c, s=1 and [[ψ]]c, s=1
[[(φ ∧ ψ)]]c, s=0 iff [[φ]]c, s=0 or [[ψ]]c, s=0
[[¬φ ]]c, s=1 iff [[φ ]]c, s=0
[[¬φ ]]c, s=0 iff [[φ ]]c, s=1
4. Quantification
a. [[∀αφ]]c, s=1 iff for all x∈X, [[φ]]c, s[α−>x]=1
[[∀αφ]]c, s=# iff for some x∈X, [[φ]]c, s[α−>x]=#
b. [[Alwβφ]]c, s=1 iff for all t∈T, [[φ]]c, s[β−>t]=1
[[Alwβφ]]c, s=# iff for some t∈T, [[φ]]c, s[β−>t]=#
c. [[Necγφ]]c, s=1 iff for all w∈W, [[φ]]c, s[γ−>w]=1
[[Necγφ]]c, s=# iff for some w∈W, [[φ]]c, s[γ−>w]=#
d. Let α’ be a term and α a variable.
[[α’αφ]]c, s=1 iff for the d such that d=[[α’]]c, s, [[φ]]c, s[α−>d]=1
[[α’αφ]]c, s=# iff for the d such that d=[[α’]]c, s, [[φ]]c, s[α−>d]=#
5. Attitude operators
Let ATT be an attitude operator.
[[ATT<α’, β’, γ’> δφ]]c, s=1 iff for all c'∈KATT(<[[α’]]c, s, [[β’]]c, s, [[γ’]]c, s>): [[φ]] c, s[δ−>c'] =1
[[ATT<α’, β’, γ’> δφ]]c, s=# iff for some c'∈KATT(<[[α’]]c, s, [[β’]]c, s, [[γ’]]c, s>): [[φ]] c, s[δ−>c'] =#
Use of negative features
Negative features do not have a semantic contribution. However, they are subject to the following
condition:
A negative feature can appear in a logical form only if  the corresponding positive feature would
have yielded a presupposition failure (i.e. would have yielded the value #).
Compatibility condition relating the initial assignment and the context of utterance.
s is an assignment determined by c [abbreviation: ‘s(c)’] only if s properly represents the referential
intentions of cA at cT in cW
Derivations
(i) a. I exist (is true in every context in which it can be felicitously uttered)
b. exist(xi{+author*(xi)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1(wl, c*)})
c. [[(b)]]c, s=# iff s(xi)≠cA or s(tk)≠cT or s(wl)≠cW. If ≠#, [[(b)]]c, s=1 iff <s(xi), s(tk), s(wl)> 
∈Ic(exist), iff < cA, cT, cW>∈Ic(exist), which is true by stipulation.
Note: The compatibility condition on s and c forces s(c*) to be c, hence the results above.
(ii) a. I am speaking  (is true in every context in which it can be felicitously uttered)
b. speak(xi{+author*(xi)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1(wl, c*)})
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c. same derivation as in (i), with ‘speak’ replacing ‘exist’.
(iii) a. It is necessary that I exist (may be false)
b.Nec wl exist(xi{+author*(xi)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl)
c. [[(b)]]c, s=# iff s(xi)≠cA or s(tk)≠cT If ≠#, [[(b)]]c, s=1 iff for all w∈W, 
[[exist(xi{+author*(xi)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative2*(wl)})]]c, s[wi−>w]=1, which does not 
have to be the case.
Note: It is crucial here that  no ‘indicative’ feature appear on the embedded verb.
(iv) a. It is necessary that I be speaking (may be false)
b. Nec wl speak(xi{+author*(xi)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl)
c. same derivation as in (iii), with ‘speak’ replacing ‘exist’.
Note: It is crucial here that  no ‘indicative’ feature appear on the embedded verb.
 (v)  a. You are being addressed (true when uttered felicitously)
b. addressed(xi{+hearer*(xi)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1(wl, c*)})
c. [[(b)]]c, s=# unless s(xi)∈ Ic(+hearer*), s(tk)=cT, s(wl)=cW. If ≠#,
[[(b)]]c, s=1 iff <s(xi), s(tk), s(wl)> ∈Ic(be-addressed). But since Ic(+hearer*)⊆{x: <x, cT, 
cW>∈Ic(be-addressed)}, this is always the case when the value of the sentence is not #.
(vi) a. She is female (true when uttered felicitously)
b. female(xi{+feminine(xi)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1(wl, c*)})
c. [[(b)]]c, s=# unless s(xi)∈ Ic(+feminine), s(tk)=cT, s(wl)=cW. If ≠#,
[[(b)]]c, s=1 iff <s(xi), s(tk), s(wl)> ∈Ic(female). But since Ic(+feminine)⊆{x: <x, cT, cW>∈Ic(female)},
this is always the case when the value of the sentence is not #.
 (vii) a. [Pointing] You are elected and (but) you are not elected  (may be true)
b. elected(xi{+hearer*(xi)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1(wl, c*)})
& ¬elected(xm{+hearer*(xm)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1(wl)})
c. [[(b)]]c, s=# unless s(xi), s(xm)∈ Ic(+hearer*), s(tk)=cT, s(wl)=cW. If ≠#,
[[(b)]]c, s=1 iff [[elected(xi{+hearer*(xi)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1(wl)})]]c, s=1 and
[[elected(xm{+hearer*(xm)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1(wl)})]]c, s=0, iff
<s(xi), s(tk), s(wl)> ∈Ic(be-elected) and <s(xm), s(tk), s(wl)> ∉Ic(be-elected), which may both be true
if s(xi)≠ s(xm)
(viii) a. I like my mother (can have a bound variable reading)
b. xi{+author*(xi)} xm{+author*(xm)} like(xm{+author*(xm)}, mother xm{+author*(xm)},
tk{+present* (tk)}, wl{+indicative1(wl, c*)})
Note:  xi{+author*(xi)} is the variable binder, and xm{+author*(xm)} is the bound variable64.
c. [[(b)]]c, s=# iff s(xi)≠cA or if for d=s(xi),
[[like(xm{+author*(xm)}, mother xm{+author*(xm)},  tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1(wl, c*)})]]c,
s[xm->d]
=#.
In sum, [[(b)]]c, s=# iff s(xi)≠cA or s(tk)≠cT or s(wl)≠cW
                                                 
64
 In a system with λ-abstraction, this would be written as:
xi{+author*xi} λxm{+author*xm}like(xm{+author*xm}, mother xm{+author*xm},  ...)
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If ≠#, [[(b)]]c, s=1 iff [[like(xm{+author*(xm)}, mother xm{+author*(xm)},  tk{+present*(tk)},
wl{+indicative1(wl)})]]c, s[xm->s(xi)]=1. Since [[(b)]]c, s≠# only if s(xi)=cA,  s(tk)=cT and s(wl)=cW, [[(b)]]c,
s
=1 iff
<cA, Ic(mother)(cA), cT, cW>∈Ic(like).
(ix) a. John hopes to be elected
b. HOPE<John, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1*(wl)}>ci be-elected(ιxm{+author(xm, ci)}, ιtn{+present(tn, ci)},
ιwp{+indicative1(wp, ci)})
c. [[(b)]]c,s =# iff s(tk)≠cT or s(wl)≠cw 65. If [[(b)]]c,s ≠#,
[[(b)]]c,s =1 iff for all c’∈KHOPE(<John, cT., cW>), [[be-elected(ιxm{+author(xm, ci)},
ιtk{+present(tk, ci)}, ιwl{+indicative1(wl, ci)})]]c, s[ci−>c’]=1, iff for all c’∈KHOPE(<John, cT., cW>),
<c’A, c’T, c’w>∈Ic (be-elected)
Note: (i) All embedded elements are treated as ‘De Se’. (ii) The LF in b. does not capture the fact
that the embedded elements must take as argument the closest context. This should presumably be
derived from a syntactic condition on Control.
(x) a. I am elected (Amharic)
b. be-elected(xm{+author(xm, ci)}, tn{+present(tn, ci)}, wp{+indicative1(wp, ci)})
c. [[(b)]]c,s =# iff s(xm)≠ (s(ci))A or s(tn)≠ (s(ci))T  or s(wp)≠ (s(ci))W. If [[(b)]]c,s ≠#,
[[(b)]]c,s =1 iff <s(xm), s(tn), s(wp)> ∈Ic(be-elected)
d. The compatibility condition requires that s properly represent the referential intentions of
cA at cT in cW. This must be appealed to in order to ensure that s(ci)=c.
Note: (i) The latter observation predicts that there could be differences between Amharic ‘I’
and English ‘I’ even in unembedded sentences (under certain conditions it could be that
s(ci)≠c, if such are the referential intentions of the speaker). I do not know whether this is
correct.
(ii) For simplicity Amharic tense and mood have been treated as shiftable indexicals
(by analogy with Amharic ‘I’).
(xi) a. Johni says that Ii am elected (Amharic)
b. SAY<John, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl[+indicative1*(wl)}>ci be-elected(ιxm{+author(xm, ci)}, ιtn{+present(tn, ci)},
ιwp{+indicative1(wp, ci)})
c. [[(b)]]c,s =# iff s(tk)≠cT or s(wl)≠cw 66. If [[(b)]]c,s ≠#,
[[(b)]]c,s =1 iff for all c’∈KSAY(<John, cT., cW>), [[be-elected(ιxm{+author(xm, ci)},
ιtk{+present(tk, ci)}, ιwl{+indicative1(wl, ci)})]]c, s[ci−>c’]=1, iff for all c’∈KSAY(<John, cT., cW>),
<c’A, c’T, c’w>∈Ic(be-elected)
(xii) a. John says that he* is elected (Ewe/Gokana)
b. SAY<John, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1*(wl)}>ci be-elected(ιxm{(+author(xm, ci) ∧ -author*(xm))},
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 The full condition is: [[(b)]]c,s =# iff s(tk)≠cT or s(wl)≠cw or for some c’∈KHOPE(<John, cT., cW>), it is not the case that:
there is exactly one x in X and there is exactly one t in T and there ix exactly one w in W satisfying:
[[+author(xm, ci)]] c,s[ci->c’][xm->x]=1 and [[+present(tn, ci)]] c,s[ci->c’][tn->t]=1 and and [[+indicative1(wp, ci)]] c,s[ci->c’][wp->w]=1. But
this condition is always met given the existence and uniqueness of one agent, time and world per context.
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 The full condition is: [[(b)]]c,s =# iff s(tk)≠cT or s(wl)≠cw or for some c’∈KHOPE(<John, cT., cW>), it is not the case that:
there is exactly one x in X and there is exactly one t in T and there ix exactly one w in W satisfying:
[[+author(xm)(ci)]] c,s[ci->c’][xm->x]=1 and [[+present(tn)(ci)]] c,s[ci->c’][tn->t]=1 and and [[+indicative1(wp)(ci)]] c,s[ci->c’][wp->w]=1. But
this condition is always met given the existence and uniqueness of one agent, time and world per context.
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ιtn{+present(tn, ci)], ιwp[+indicative1(wp, ci)})
c. [[(b)]]c,s =# iff s(tk)≠cT or s(wl)≠cw. If [[(b)]]c,s ≠#,
[[(b)]]c,s =1 iff for all c’∈KSAY(<John, cT., cW>), [[be-elected(ιxm{(+author(xm, ci) ∧ -
author*(xm)}, ιtk{+present(tk, ci)}, ιwl{+indicative1(wl, ci)})]]c, s[ci−>c’]=1. Given the semantic
vacuousness of negative features, this is equivalent to: for all c’∈KSAY(<John, cT., cW>), <c’A,
c’T, c’w>∈Ic(be-elected)
d. Condition of use of -author*(xm): replacing -author*(xm) with +author*(xm) should have
produced a presupposition failure. This is indeed the case if for some c’∈KSAY(<John, cT.,
cW>), c’A≠ cA (this always holds unless John is claiming that he is me, the agent of the actual
speech act).
Note: For simplicity, the embedded tense and mood have been treated as shifted indexicals.
(xiii) a. #I say that I* am elected (Gokana)
b. SAY< xh{author*(xh)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1*(wl)}>ci be-elected(ιxm{((+author(xm, ci) ∧  -
author*(xm)) ∧ +author*(xm))}, ιtn{+present(tn, ci)}, ιwp{+indicative1(wp, ci)})
c. (b) cannot be used felicitously because of the clause:
{((+author(xm, ci) ∧  -author*(xm)) ∧ +author*(xm))}
‘-author*(xm)’ can be used only if ‘+author*(xm)’ yields a presupposition failure.
But since ‘+author*(xm)’ also appears in the same clause (so that it is evaluated under the
same assignments), the sentence cannot be uttered felicitously.
Note: The ungrammaticality/oddity of a. could be derived in some cases even if ‘I*’ were
not given a specification for +author*. The embedded clause would be represented as:
be-elected(ιxm{(+author(xm)(ci) ∧  -author*(xm))}, ιtn{+present(tn, ci)}, ιwp{+indicative1(wp,
ci)})
In case the speaker has no uncertainty concerning who he is (a common situation), it will be
the case that:
for all c’∈KSAY(<cA, cT., cW>), c’A= cA. As a result, +author*(xm) could be used instead of -
author*(xm) without causing a presupposing failure. But if it can be used, it must be used,
which explains the deviance of (a). [This predicts that (a) should become grammatical if the
speaker is uncertain of his identity].
(xiv) a. John believes that Mary be* sick (German)
b. BELIEVE<John, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1*(wl)}>ci sick(Mary, ιtn{+present(tn, ci)},
ιwp{(+indicative1(wp, ci) ∧ -indicative2*(wp))})
c. [[(b)]]c,s =# iff s(tk)≠cT or s(wl)≠cw.  If [[(b)]]c,s ≠#,
[[(b)]]c,s =1 iff for all c’∈KBELIEVE(<John, cT., cW>), [[sick(Mary, ιtn{+present(tn, ci)},
ιwp{(+indicative1(wp, ci) ∧ -indicative2*(wp))})]]c, s[ci−>c’]=1. Given the semantic vacuousness
of negative features, this is equivalent to: for all c’∈KBELIEVE(<John, cT., cW>), <Mary, c’T,
c’w>∈Ic(sick)
d. Condition of use of -indicative2*(wp): replacing -indicative2*(wp) with +indicative2*(wp)
should have produced a presupposition failure. This is indeed the case if for some
c’∈KBELIEVE(<John, cT., cW>), c’A∉ KBELIEVE(<cA, cT., cW>) (this holds unless John’s epistemic
alternatives are a subset of my, the speaker’s, epistemic alternatives).
(xv) a. #I believe that Mary be* sick (German)
b. BELIEVE< xh{author*(xh)}, tk{+present*(tk)}, wl{+indicative1*(wl)}>ci sick(Mary, ιtn{+present(tn, ci)},
ιwp{(+indicative1(wp, ci) ∧ -indicative2*(wp))})
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c. [[(b)]]c, s=# if s(xh)≠cA or s(tk)≠cT or s(wl)≠cW. But if s(xh)=cA and s(tk)=cT and s(wl)=cW, for
every c’∈KBELIEVE(<s(xh), s(tk), s(wl)>) (i.e. for every c’∈KBELIEVE(<cA, cT., cW>)),
[[ιwp{(+indicative1(wp, ci) ∧ -indicative2*(wp))}]]c, s[ci->c’]= c’W
But since <s(xh), s(tk), s(wl)>= <cA, cT., cW>, for every c’∈KBELIEVE(<s(xh), s(tk), s(wl)>):
c’∈KBELIEVE(<cA, cT., cW>), and thus [[indicative2*(wp)]]c, s[wp->c’w]=1, which entails that
[[ιwp{(+indicative1(wp, ci) ∧+indicative2*(wp))}]]c, s[ci->c’]= c’W. In other words,
+indicative2*(wp) could be used instead of -indicative2*(wp) without causing a presupposition
failure. But if it can be used, it must be used, which explains the deviance of (a).
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